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RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN DIGITALLY DISTRIBUTED WORKS
Introduction
Last year MTV made it to the movies with that not so lovable
pair of neo-teens representing juvenile' Americana, Beavis and But-
thead.1 Crass, anal retentive, and self-indulgent, the boys make a road-
trip across the United States, even dropping in on President Clinton
for a little chat in the Oval Office. Along the way, they experience an
America satirized for its cultural faults and provincial values.
It is not difficult to imagine a follow-up movie Where the boys
"do" the European continent. In the hypothetical adventure, they
might pass through the Louvre pausing for a particularly poignant
moment to comment on the fact that the world's most famous babe,
whom they label Moaner Lisa, is really a "dog." Sneaking a snap-shot
with a portable comic-book spy camera,-the boys create a morphed up
digitized image which features themselves kissing Mona on the
cheeks. It is sent to friends at home via e-mail.2
They might also chug red wine during a visit to a symphonic per-
formance of certain works by Dmitri Shostakovich, and take in an old
black and white movie of the "Bicycle Thief" genre. The entire romp
through the continent would constitute a barbed chuckle poking fun at
Euro-culture. The movie might feature an artful blend of animation
and real images, distorted and manipulated to create a seamless audio-
visual work. The makers of the film have diligently obtained licenses
to feature musical works, clips of film noir, and digitized images of art
works. Prior to opening night in Hollywood, MTV might make sneak-
previews of the film available at mtv.com.
Within days of release Viacom, MTV's parent company, might
receive a small pile of complaints alleging violations of a certain right
of integrity in the artistic creations depicted in the film. Although the
pieces featured in the movie were either properly licensed for use, or
had passed into the public domain, these moral rights claims stem
from inalienable rights which reach past the exclusive economic rights
and which some foreign artists enjoy under national copyright protec-
tion.3 In such cases, a gossamer thread remains attached to each mani-
1. See BEAVIS AND BUTTHEAD Do AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1996).
2. Must See the Mona Mailart Show (visited Feb. 11, 1998) <http://
www.geocities.com/SoHo/7022/>. The digitally manipulated e-mail postcards at this
Website are reproduced in part at Appendix I. The reproductions do no justice to the bril-
liant colors and detail featured at the Web-site. The issues discussed in this paper concern-
ing the right of integrity in works of authorship are illustrated exceedingly well at this
Website.
3. See generally Christine L. Chinni, Droit D'Auteur Versus The Economics of Copy-
right: Implications for American Law of Accession to the Berne Convention, 14 W. NEW
1997]
festation of a work which was created, some attached from beyond the
grave into near perpetuity.4 The Internet may indeed be a World
Wide Web for the assertion of these claims.
This scenario points out an area of difficulty in international
copyright law that will manifest itself in the near future: moral rights
claims in cyberspace. Law journals are lately enriched with articles
heralding the impact of cyberspace on copyright law.5 A major area of
concern is the strength of copyright law in the digital environment.6
Some espouse the ultimate freedom of the digital environment and
claim copyright cannot survive the seamless, borderless, sovereignty-
altering World Wide Web.7 Across the aisle, however, stand those
who assert that modest changes to existing legal regimes will be suffi-
cient to overcome objective problems with copyright application in a
globally driven marketplace.
8
The advent of the Internet has provided fertile material for juris-
prudential prognostication.9 From an economic perspective it is a sig-
nificant area of interest since intellectual property seems to have
reached a desirable and exalted commercial status in international
trade.10 The value of intellectual property is an area of keen interest to
ENG. L. REV. 145 (1992).
4. See Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and Exploitations in International
Private Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston Film Colorization Controversy, 15
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 135 (1991).
5. In February 1997, an electronic search revealed approximately 44 law review and
journal articles featuring the words "digital," "Internet," or some derivation of "cyber" in
the title. Of interest in the context of digitally modified works are the following: Paul Ed-
ward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International Copyright in a
Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571 (1996); Jenevra Georgini,
International Digital Publishing and Territorial Copyright: Is The European Union Letting
Infringers Slip Through Its "Nets?," 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 243 (1995); Kenneth D. Suzan,
Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S. Copyright Law for Music Dis-
tribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. L. REV. 789 (1995); Don E. Tomlinson & Christopher R.
Harris, Free-Lance Photojournalism in a Digital World; Copyright, Lanham Act and Droit
Moral Considerations Plus a Sui Generis Solution, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1992).
6. See Benjamin R. Kuhn, A Dilemma in Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for
Intellectual Property Distributed over the Information Superhighways of Today and Tomor-
row, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 171 (1996).
7. See The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infrastructure 15 (1995) [hereinafter White Paper]
(referring to the argument that intellectual property laws are not applicable in cyberspace
because the individuals who use the Internet govern themselves through "netiquette" to
protect the interests of authors and artists).
8. Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law Pre-
vent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 192 (1995).
9. See Geller, supra note 5; Georgini, supra note 5; Suzan, supra note 5; Tomlinson &
Harris, supra note 5.
10. See Jack Valenti, Piracy of Creative Works No Mickey Mouse Theft, HOUS.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:59
RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN DIGITALLY DISTRIBUTED WORKS
U.S. international trade policy pundits, and protection of copyrighted
materials internationally is of critical economic importance to some
industry sectors.1 Copyrighted books, music, movies and software
"croutinely generate a trade surplus of up to $30 billion a year." 12 The
GATT TRIPS Agreement 13 brought intellectual property protection
firmly under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization, and
copyrighted materials rank as a significant commodity as indicated by
the efforts made to combat international copyright piracy.14 The pro-
tection of creative expression is viewed as critical to the success of
building a Global Information Infrastructure ("GII") since protection
of digital content will provide the necessary incentive required to
power the engines of new age interconnectedness.
1 5
The entertainment industry is a major driving force behind the
development of digitally delivered content.1 6 In March of 1997,
America Online announced that it would launch an entertainment di-
CHRON., May 8, 1996, at 39.
11. See Robert Holleyman, Software Piracy Abroad: Challenges and Opportunities,
453 PLI/PAT 421 (1996). Department of Commerce estimates place worldwide market
value for software products alone at over $100 billion dollars annually. Overseas opportu-
nity for exploitation of entertainment products, including movies, music, and video games
command an even greater portion of the trading scene with balance of trade figures provid-
ing a basis for extra attention and focus on these areas. The Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 included provisions to facilitate the Uruguay Round of the GATT ne-
gotiations and the "Special 301" provisions both designed to encourage the protection of
intellectual property rights in foreign countries. The Special 301 provisions grant authority
for the U.S. Trade Representative to identify and list countries which do not honor intel-
lectual property rights - in order to focus action against nations which permit copyright pi-
racy and other intellectual property theft. See generally Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
"Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementation and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
2259 (1989-90).
12. John Patrick Kelch, Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., The
Berne Convention and the Extraterritorial Application of the Copyright Act, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1839 (1996).
13. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 14,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) in General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (as amended) [hereinafter TRIPS].
14. See Business Software Alliance, Computer Industry Groups Support New WIPO
Treaties, M2 PRESSWIRE available in 1996 WL 1455246.
15. White Paper, supra note 7, at 15. The GIl is conceived as an "integrated broad
band digital communications system" which will link people across the globe through com-
puters, televisions, phone lines, fax machines and radios. Id. European ministerial confer-
ences have also concluded that strong legal and technical protection are required to foster
the "necessary climate for the investment needed for the development of the information
society." Robert Rice, Business and the Law: Gunning for the Pirates - The Film Industry
Faces New Concerns Over Copyright, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at 12.
16. Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Policy, Selected Tax Policy Implications
of Global Electronic Commerce (last modified Nov. 27, 1996) <http://www.ustreas.gov>.
See also Valenti, supra note 10.
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vision, "Greenhouse Networks," funded to produce content for the
AOL empire. 17 In addition, the race to exploit new and existing pipe-
lines encourages the formation of internationally expansive coopera-
tives to take advantage of the global market for the digital distribution
of entertainment products. British Telecommunications recently an-
nounced a joint venture with British Sky Broadcasting which will focus
on the provision of digital TV broadcasting services and Internet ac-
cess. 1
8
The race for exploitation of entertainment content creates con-
flicts of laws issues in this increasingly complex sector of international
trade.19 Proponents of the application of copyright protection in cy-
berspace assert that certain modifications to the existing international
copyright regime will overcome the immediate obstacles to global dis-
tribution of copyrighted materials.20 However, significant disagree-
ment remains over the extent of protection which should be afforded
to those cousins of copyright's economic siblings, moral rights. The
subject of moral rights is an area where large differences remain be-
tween national copyright regimes.21 In cyberspace, moral rights take
on a special significance because they "adhere to the individual
author" sometimes in perpetuity.
22
This article asserts that, in particular, the so-called right of integ-
rity, may not survive the demand for entertainment products, in the
headlong rush to the digital marketplace. This proposition may be
analyzed both in terms of the technological attributes of the digital
medium, and in light of public policy premises that will provide a ba-
sis, in choice of laws questions, for overriding strong moral rights pro-
tections required under certain national regimes. Digital works by na-
ture are inherently malleable, and there are significant policy interests
in the free-flow of information and the promotion of commerce
17. Suzanne Galante, AOL Starts Showbiz Division (visited Mar. 10, 1997) <http://
www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C8641%2C00.?nd.html>.
18. Matthew Rose, BT, BskyB Digital-TV Talks Cause Static: Prospects of an Alliance
Roil the Cable Industry, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 23, 1996, at 4. British Telecom has also
announced that it will buy MCI Communications, resulting in the second largest long dis-
tance carrier in the world with 183,000 employees and 43 million customers located in 72
countries. See Jeff Pelline, BT to Buy MCI for $20 Billion (visited Nov. 4, 1996) <http://
www.news.com/News/item/0,4,5015,00.html>.
19. See Geller, supra note 5, at 573.
20. See generally White Paper, supra note 7, at 211.
21. See generally Stephen Fraser, Berne, CFTA, NAFTA & GATT: The Implications
of Copyright Droit Moral and Cultural Exemptions in International Trade Law, 18
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 287 (1996).
22. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 4.22 (1996) [hereinafter IN-
FORMATION LAW].
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through an increasingly global marketplace. These factors will become
important choice of law determinants which may outweigh the artist
protection interests predicable of the right of integrity.
Part I of this article provides a brief historic overview of the de-
velopment of moral rights and focuses specifically on connotative and
denotative definitions of the so called right of integrity. Part II ana-
lyzes recent advances in telecommunications technology, the charac-
teristics of digitally distributable works, and the recent developments
in copyright law purporting to address changing needs. Part III sets
forth a basic framework for claims in international copyright cases, the
elements of analysis of conflicts of laws principles generally, and pol-
icy issues which will likely effect the outcome of claims for violations
of the right of integrity. Part IV summarizes cases which illuminate the
relevant issues as raised in former claims for violations of the right of
integrity. Part V examines the practical problems and issues which
must be addressed in order to frame a workable regime in the realm of
international digital copyright law. The article concludes that en-
forcement of the right of integrity is inconsistent with the nature of art
and cyberspace.
I
Historic Development of the Right of Integrity
A. Overview of the Development of Moral Rights Protection and the Berne
Convention
Early English copyrights were not granted for the benefit of
authors, but for the purpose of insuring a monopoly hold on the pub-
lishing industry.23 During the period of the Star Chamber Decree of
1586 the interests of the English crown and book publishers converged
when the government permitted tightly controlled rights to print cop-
ies of books, thus watching over the printing presses in order to police
for seditious materials.
24
Over time, the monopoly became distasteful to certain members
of parliament, and a call for releasing the printers control over copy-
right interests, which could exist in perpetuity, resulted in a statutory
grant of copyright protection for the limited time of 14 years.25 The
23. See L. R. Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 223, 225 (1966) (the earliest copyrights were granted through publisher's guilds for
the benefit of printers and sellers of books).
24. Id. at 231.
25. Id. at 225.
1997]
Statute of Anne, which served as a model for American copyright'law,
was concerned more with breaking up the publisher's monopoly than
it was with protection of authors.2 6 Its effect was a serious dent in the
monopoly power, and resulted in a campaign by the publishing houses
for recognition of a common law copyright separate from the statutory
rights which could serve as a basis for continued interest in a book af-
ter the statutory term ran out.
27
The publishers were initially successful. In Millar v. Taylor, the
court heard an argument which contemplated perpetual personal
rights inherent in a work of authorship which flowed from concepts of
natural law. 28 Lord Mansfield argued that the author had a common
law copyright interest which remhined with the author even after the
statutory term ended, because if the statute represented the sum total
of the author's interests then:
He is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control
over the correctness of his own work. He can not prevent additions.
He can not retract errors. He can not amend or cancel a faulty edi-
tion. Any one may print, pirate, and perpetuate the imperfections, to
the disgrace and against the will of the author; may propagate sen-
timents under his name, which he disapproves, repents and is
ashamed of. He can exercise no discretion as to the manner in which,
or persons by whom his work shall be published.29
The argument was successful and the result was the recoupment
of the near perpetual interest in the works owned once again by the
publishers, and conceived as separate from the economic interests
granted under the Statute of Anne. This early supposition that an
author maintains a personal interest in a work after the statutory in-
terests are exhausted has been construed as an early flickering ema-
nation of moral rights jurisprudence.
30
Ultimately, this position was rejected in Donaldson v. Beckett,
where the court ruled that the statutory rights contemplated the entire
bundle of rights possessed by an author, strictly construed as an ar-
rangement between the state and an author: a social contract.31 Thus,
Anglo-American copyright laws bundle together certain property in-
terests and remedies and call these entitlements "copyrights." 32 This
26. Chinni, supra note 3, at 163.
27. Patterson, supra note 23, at 225.
28. 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769) (discussed in Patterson, supra note 23, at
224-25).
29. Id.
30. See Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Com-
mon Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229-30 (1995).
31. 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774).
32. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL
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common law basis focuses primarily on the promotion of a public
benefit through protection of economic rights for a limited time and
was based on a "social contract" theory.
33
During the late eighteenth century there was initially a harmony
of purpose in the development of copyright law in civil and common
law countries.3n Both French and U.S. copyright laws developed in an
environment filled with talk of promoting the good of democratic so-
cieties.35 Commentators asserting differences in the theoretical bases
for French and U.S. copyright laws sometimes overlook the common
goals propounded in both countries at the time copyright laws were
enacted.36
After an initial period of common philosophic framework, copy-
right laws in civil law countries began to encompass a distinct philo-
sophical flavor based on the droit d'auter or authors rights.37 This basis
for protection of artistic creations was grounded on the natural rights
theory regarding authorial rights as flowing from a right of personal-
ity.38 Broad protection for moral rights developed in French jurispru-
dence 39 in an environment of global recognition for the quality and
value of French artwork acquired over the centuries.4 0 The essential
notion was that artistic creations are characterized as an extension of
personality and the spiritual effort of a creator who obtained a high
calling in society.4 These may be distinguished from copyrights since
such moral rights are based on a self-perpetuating personal interest in
a creative work, rather than on utilitarian principles of advancing the
public good overall.
4 2
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2[b] (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER & GELLER].
33. White Paper, supra note 7, at 133.
34. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolution-
ary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 996 (1990).
35. See id. at 1023.
36. These goals include advancing the public good with incentives to authors, based
not upon the ascendancy of authors rights, but as a policy to promote the goals of an in-
formed democratic public. See id. at 1006.
37. See Chinni, supra note 3, at 150-51.
38. See NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (1995) [hereinafter NIMMER Treatise].
39. Chinni, supra note 3, at 151. French case law developed to grant broad protection
of moral rights over three distinct judicial periods, 1783-1878, 1878-1902, 1902-1957, result-
ing in the modern approach which adjudges moral rights and economic rights as distinct
categories. Id.
40. See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1023, 1042 (1976).
41. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.01[A].
42. See White Paper, supra note 7, at 133. The utilitarian model has served as the basis
for copyright jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (main objective of copyright law is to promote the
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In the civil law model, economic rights are granted to provide for
commercial exploitation just as they are under the Anglo-American
model, however the key point of divergence provides a separate
branch of protection for interests in a work categorized as droit
moraux or moral rights.4 3 Moral rights provide a link through which
the artist retains a separate measure of personal control over a work
even after the economic rights have been alienated or the work has
passed into the public domain." These rights are generally considered
to be inalienable and maintain an independent viability separate from
the economic rights which may be assigned to a third party.45 The gen-
eral principle is that the assignment of economic rights does not fore-
close the assertion of moral rights.46 Although they are non-economic
rights, meaning that they do not provide a basis for income to the
author, pecuniary damages have been assessed for moral rights viola-
tions.
47
The moral rights include the droit au respect du nom; and the
droit a la paternite, together designated as the right of attribution;
48
the droit au respect de l'oeuvre;49 the droit de divulgation;5 ° and the
droit de retrait or droit de repentir.5 1 Taken together as a class of
authorial rights, the moral rights create a certain pluralism in the pro-
tection of works of authorship in civil law countries. However the
moral (non-economic) rights and the economic rights to commercial-
ize a work are generally grouped together in civil law intellectual
property codes. For example, in the 1992 codification of French intel-
"Progress of Science and useful Arts."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (copyright law to provide the economic incentive to promote the circu-
lation of free expression).
43. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.01[A].
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. § 8D.01 [B].
47. See Adolf Dietz, Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 199,212 (1995).
48. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.01 [A]. Variations on the right of attri-
bution include: the right to be known as the author of a work; the right to prevent others
from falsely attributing authorship to an author; the right to prevent others to be falsely
named as the author of a work; the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudony-
mously; and the right to prevent others from using the author's name in a way which ad-
versely affects his professional standing.
49. See id. This is the so-called "right of integrity."
50. See id., referring to the right to publish or withhold a work from publication.
51. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, §8D.01[A], referring to the right to retract a
work from distribution if it is no longer consistent with the views of the author.
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lectual property law, moral rights protections are set forth in Chapter
I of the section on Copyright.52
There are many national variations in the types of moral rights
protections and "no country affords every conceivable species of
moral right."53 In fact, in the American tradition, they are generally
not recognized as such and to the extent that commensurate protec-
tions avail themselves, they are presented under other substantive ar-
eas of common and state statutory law. 54 For example, non-economic
interests related to works of authorship may be protected under laws
of privacy, unfair competition, or defamation. 55 Moral rights have not
been favored under the Anglo-American system and resistance to
them has been found over the last century in spite of international
treaty efforts seeking to harmonize copyright protections.
56
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works of 1886 provides a basis for international copyright protec-
tion.57 The purpose of the treaty was to provide minimum standards of
copyright protection in signatory nations, and equal legal treatment
for citizens of a forum state and foreigners seeking copyright protec-
tion in that forum.58 Under Berne, foreign copyright holders may not
be subjected to discriminatory treatment favoring the nationals of the
forum state.
59
52. See Dietz, supra note 47, at 201. Copyright Act of 1965 the moral rights, Urheber-
personlichkeitrecht, are found in Chapter 4. Id. at 202.
53. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.01[A].
54. The notable exception is the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") codified at 17
U.S.C. § 106A, discussed infra at section I.C.
55. See NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 2[b].
56. See Chinni, supra note 3, at 157-58.
57. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September
9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, com-
pleted at Berne on March 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June
26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, amended at Paris on
July 24, 1979 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The treaty is administered by the World In-
tellectual Property Organization. As of November 15, 1996 there were 119 member na-
tions. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (last modified Feb. 17, 1998)
<http://www.wipo.org/ eng/index.htm>.
58. See Chinni, supra note 3, at 157. Minimum standards are basic protections which
must be enforced through national laws in order to accord authors uniform protection
throughout the Berne Union; whereas the national treatment principle requires that for-
eign copyright holders seeking relief must receive no less protection than that accorded
citizens of the host forum. See Ralph Oman, The Impact of The Berne Convention on U.S.
Copyright, 455 PLIIPAT 233, 238-39 (1996).
59. See Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-92/92, Court of Justice
of the European Community, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 773 (Oct. 20, 1993) (law granting protec-
tion only to German citizens to halt the sale of bootlegged recordings of rock concerts vio-
lated the non-discrimination national treatment principle of Berne).
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The Berne Convention hosts members from both utilitarian and
natural rights schools of thought and thus accommodates differing le-
gal traditions. Compromise was part of the international necessity
from the beginning.60 The Convention existed for 42 years before
moral rights were explicitly contemplated in the revision conference in
Rome in 1928.61 The Rome conference records state that countries
with common law traditions "were not familiar with the concept of
moral rights as such, nor did they fully understand the differences in
the nature of legal thought between [themselves] and continental sys-
tems of copyright. ' 62 The compromise language "tacitly acknowledged
that the protection then offered at common law and equity by the
common law countries of the Berne Union was adequate for the pur-
pose of the new provision" protecting moral rights. 63
Specifically, the treaty provides minimum standards of moral
rights protection in Article 6bis;64 the right of attribution and the right
of integrity. Although these rights represent the "minimum standards"
for moral rights protections, signatories are permitted to provide
greater moral rights protection.65 There is no uniform contemplation
of the scope, types or nature of moral rights as implemented in the
various national laws. 66 Thus, protection is uneven among the mem-
bers of the Berne Convention.
60. See Chinni, supra note 3, at 157-58.
61. See Dworkin, supra note 30, at 231-32.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 232.
64. Berne Convention article 6bis provides that:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor
or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic
rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those countries
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act,
does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, af-
ter his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means for redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
65. Dietz, supra note 47, at 205.
66. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.01[A].
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B. Defining The Right of Integrity
The right of integrity, as such, is not specifically mentioned in the
Berne Convention. The Convention states that "the author shall have
the right to ... object to any distortion, mutilation or other modifica-
tion of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."67 Although the
phrase "right of integrity" has been used in much of the literature to
characterize this right,68 it is helpful to place the phrase in a connota-
tive and denotative context.
The denotation of the phrase, designating its belongingness to a
certain class of things,69 classifies the right of integrity as a moral or
personal right. This means that a right of integrity is non-economic
and preserves some control over a creative work to the author even
after the exclusive economic rights have been alienated or terminated.
The connotative meaning of the phrase, defining the essential at-
tributes70 of the right of integrity, is much more difficult to pin down.
The general idea is that the "substance, character and spirit" of a
creation must be faithfully represented in public manifestations of the
work. 71 The artistic expression must be communicated to the public in
a manner consistent with the artist's personality, which is conceived as
metaphysically incorporated in the work. The focus here is on the art-
ist's work, not on his personal integrity. However, it is not always clear
whether this attribute of the right of integrity must be objectively re-
lated to the artist's public persona, or defined subjectively in terms of
the artist's personal standards.
Some national regimes include a requirement of proof that a
modification of a work is so egregious that it constitutes a harm to his
honor and reputation as an essential attribute of the right of integ-
rity,72 whereas other nations permit the author to object to any change
in a work that he finds subjectively distasteful. 73 These permutations
make the connotative meaning of the phrase right of integrity difficult
to define. The essence of the word may be thus defined either with
67. See Berne Convention Article 6bis.
68. See, e.g., Oman, supra note 58, at 240.
69. See generally IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION To LOGIC (1982).
70. See id.
71. Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4, at 153.
72. This is consistent with the requirement in the Berne Convention article 6bis. It
should be noted that the Convention provides no definition for the terms "derogatory,"
"reputation," or "honor."




reference to the reputation and honor of the artist, or in terms of the
preservation of the work as communicated in its original state,
To complete the explanation of the phrase right of integrity, this
concept must be distinguished from the right to authorize adaptations
or to create derivative works. The Berne Convention provides an eco-
nomic right to the author to authorize adaptations of his work. 74 The
right includes the power to authorize "adaptations, arrangements and
other alterations" which incorporate expression from the artist's
original work.75 This is an economic right which allows an artist to
commercialize his works in a variety of media, and which may be as-
signed or licensed to a third party. In U.S. copyright law this right is
characterized as the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work. 7 6 However, the artist's personal right of
integrity in a work remains with her and may be asserted, even where
adaptation has been authorized, if the adapted version of a work does
not capture the essence of the underlying work.77 Thus, even where a
license to create an adapted version of a work is acquired, a waiver of
moral rights should be obtained when possible.78
C. Permutations of Protection under National Regimes.
The scope of the right of integrity varies based on the statutory
schemes in the respective countries providing protection.79 In some
countries, protection mirrors the language in the Berne Convention,
and thus it is granted with reference to distortions or mutilating
74. Berne Convention, article 2(3) provides: Translations, adaptations, arrangements
of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original
works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work.
75. Berne Convention, art. 12.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1990). See generally Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and De-
rivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 209 (1982).
77. See Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4, at 152. Incomplete or inept adaptations
have been held to violate an author's moral rights. Id. However, in France an artist is not
generally permitted to leverage his moral rights to increase his compensation for an
authorized adaptation. Id. at 156-57.
78. See Michael D. Scott, Frontier Issues: Pitfalls in Developing and Marketing Multi-
media Products, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 413 (1995). In Japan any assignment of
moral rights is void, thus a license which grants consent to make modifications to a work
may be insufficient to shield the end user from liability for violations of the right of integ-
rity. See Fred Greguras, Copyright Clearances and Moral Rights, Softic Symposium '95,
Nov. 30, 1995 (visited Sept. 14, 1997) <http://www.batnet.com/oikoumene/
mmcpyt.doubts.html#moral> (on file with author). Some countries do not permit the
waiver of moral rights. See discussion of permutations of moral rights protection infra Part
I.C.
79. See White Paper, supra note 7, at 146.
[VOL. 20:59
RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN DIGITALLY DISTRIBUTED WORKS
changes which cause harm to the artist's reputation or honor.8 0 Under
this standard it is not clear whether the right extends to the physical
work only or to reproductions. It is also unclear how injury to honor
or reputation is to be adjudged. The broader scope of protection at-
taches in nations which require no injury to reputation or honor. Un-
der this permutation, any change to a work which the author finds
sufficiently objectionable can support a claim for relief. For example,
in France the droit au respect de ' oeuvre (right of integrity) provides
a right which the author can assert with no requirement that he prove
injury to his reputation or derogatory action which would negatively
effect his honor.8' In this context the right has an "unconditional or
discretionary character."
8 2
Further permutations of protection relate to the author's capacity
to waive the right of integrity and to the time frame permitted for as-
serting the right. Some national copyright regimes permit waiver of
moral rights.83 In the United Kingdom, moral rights may be waived if
a signed instrument is completed by the author.8 4 This has the practi-
cal effect of preventing an author from reaching past the assignment
of his right to create an adapted work by assertion of his right of in-
tegrity based on his objection to the way in which the work was used
by the assignee or licensee.8 5 Similarly, Canadian law allows authors to
waive moral rights without written consent.8 6
By contrast, some national copyright schemes forbid waiver.8 7
Copyright regimes in France, Italy and Spain provide that moral rights
80. See Berne Convention art. 6bis.
81. Dietz, supra note 47, at 221.
82. Id. A similar condition exists in Japanese moral rights protections which prohibit
modifications "against the author's will." See Greguras, supra note 78.
83. Nothing in the language of the Berne Convention forbids waiver mechanisms re-
lated to moral rights, nor does the treaty bar assignment. See NIMMER Treatise, supra note
38, § 8D.01[B]. See also Allen R. Grogan, Acquiring Content For New Media Works: The
Rights and Acquisition Process and Contract Drafting Considerations, 428 PLI/PAT 257, 310
(1996).
84. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.22 (citing United Kingdom Copyright Act
Article 87).
85. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.22.
86. Dworkin, supra note 30, at 245. See also Keith Acheson & Christopher Maule,
Current Copyright Issues with an International Aspect -Moral Rights, Copyright and Re-
lated Rights: The International Dimension, May 18, 1995 (visited Sept. 14, 1997) <http://
edie.cprost.sfu.ca/cjc/amb/maine.html>. It should be noted again that the assignment of
copyrights does not generally constitute a waiver of moral rights.
87. Assignment or transfer of moral rights to a third party is usually forbidden as well.
See White Paper, supra note 7, at 146. Not all nations with such expansive protection inher-
ited the civil law traditions on the subject. Dietz notes that a case in India held that moral
rights cannot be waived for unauthorized modifications. Dietz, supra note 47, at 262 (citing
1997]
are inalienable and may not be waived.88 French law in particular con-
tains expansive protection for moral rights and the right of integrity.
The relevant provision, as translated, provides that, "[t]he author shall
enjoy the right to respect for his name, his authorship, and his work.
This right Shall be attached to his person. It shall be perpetual, inal-
ienable and imprescriptable." 8
9
Although the French position is quite expansive, flowing from a
century of tradition for protection of author's rights, recent legislative
efforts in Europe have followed suit. The new Romanian copyright
law provides that moral rights may not be waived or alienated.90
As for the time frame applied to protection of the right of integ-
rity the Berne Convention provides that they should be generally co-
extensive with the economic rights provided under copyright re-
gimes. 91 In German copyright law, moral rights and economic rights
are protected under one statutorily prescribed time frame ending 70
years after the author's death.92 However, some nations protect moral
rights even after the economic rights have ceased.
The most expansive time frames for protection of the right of in-
tegrity operate in perpetuity. Under Italian law, moral rights may be
exercised by the author's family or by government authorities even af-
ter the works have passed into the public domain. 93 Since the author's
personality "lives on" in the work, the purported link to the author
exists so long as the work can be communicated to the public.94 Simi-
larly, under French law, protection is conceived as "perpetual, inalien-
able and imprescriptible." 95 In Denmark and Sweden the right of in-
Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures, Ltd. 13 A.I.R. (1987)(Delhi)).
88. Dietz, supra note 47, at 221.
89. Copyright Statute, Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property Art. 6 (Mar.
11, 1957) (cited in INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.22).
90. Hugh Jones, Improving Copyright Protection, LAW. INT'L 6, Mar. 1, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 9610693.
91. Berne Convention, article 6bis(2) provides that moral rights should be
"maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights.... However, those countries
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the pre-
ceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be
maintained."
92. Dietz, supra note 47, at 213.
93. Id. at 215.
94. Id. at 213.
95. NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.011A]. Nations with legal systems based on
French law also provide for similar protections, including Senegal, Benin, and the Central
African Republic. Id. n.16 (citing S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 467 n.510 (1987)).
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tegrity may be enforced in perpetuity where cultural interests and val-
ues are at stake.96 One claim before the Danish Ministry of Culture
asserted that the moral rights of biblical authors would be violated by
a proposed movie production about the life of Jesus Christ.97 It is clear
then that protection for the right of integrity is uneven, with a sub-
stantively divergent scope afforded to artists under various national
regimes. 98
Although most Berne Convention countries have express legisla-
tive protection for moral rights, the U.S. has been slow to join the
club. American jurisprudence has traditionally expressed antipathy for
moral rights protection, and this issue created an impasse which af-
fected U.S. views of the Berne Convention for nearly a century.
99
When the U.S. did accede to the treaty, no laws were written to ex-
pressly recognize moral rights.100 The Berne treaty was not self-
executing, and thus the implementation was effected through the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,101 which provided
that:
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the
United States thereto, and satisfaction of United States obligations
thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an author of a
work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the common law -
(1) to claim authorship of the work; or (2) to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author's honor or
reputation.1
02
Accession to the treaty created an obligation requiring that the
U.S. had to "guarantee that it would accord attribution and integrity
96. Dietz, supra note 47, at 214.
97. Id. at 214-15. The author noted that both the Danish and Dutch positions are now
obtaining a less strident tone regarding the power of the State to watch over the integrity
of works of art and literature.
98. See White Paper, supra note 7, at 146. See also INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22,
§ 4.22.
99. See generally Chinni, supra note 3, at 164-65.
100. It was the position of Congress that the general laws of the United States provided
adequate protection for moral rights interests. See NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32,
§ 3[4][a]. Support for this minimalist approach was expressed by the then Director General
of the WIPO, who noted that it was unnecessary for the United States to write explicit
statutory moral rights provisions since the common law and Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act "contain the necessary law to fulfill any obligation" stemming from article 6bis. See
The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
323 (1988) (statement of Arpad Boysch, Director General of the WIPO).
101. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988) [hereinafter BCIA].
102. BCIA, supra note 101, § 3(b).
1997]
rights pursuant to Article 6bis, at least to Berne Convention works
whose country of origin is not the United States." 1°3 Although Con-
gress claimed that the U.S. complied in spirit, some have expressed
serious doubts about the efficacy of protection for the right of integ-
rity in U.S. domestic law.
104
About ten years before the BCIA, individual states in the United
States began to experiment with statutory protection for moral rights,
including the right of integrity. These laws were premised on art pres-
ervation policies, and have now been established in ten states.105 In
California, protections for the integrity and attribution interests of
artists were written into a 1980 statute in the form of the California
Art Preservation Act." The Act provides limited protection for
works of fine art of a "recognized quality," prohibiting anyone except
the artist from intentionally defacing, mutilating, altering or destroy-
ing such a work.10 7 Furthermore, the artist was granted the right to
claim authorship of his work.108 Finally, the Act provides for injunc-
tive relief, damages and costs.
109
Berne-like protection for the right of integrity was thus contem-
plated, but in the context of protecting physical pieces of artwork
which fall within the statutory definition.110 Whereas Berne provides
moral rights protection without distinction to all types of works which
qualify for copyright protection, United States state laws focus on
works of graphic and visual art."' Half of the state statutory schemes
require that a work be of a "recognizable quality" 112 and none of them
103. NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.02[D][1].
104. Merryman, supra note 40, at 1035-36 (noting that the "right of integrity of the
work of art, simply does not exist in [U.S.] law.").
105. NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, §§ 8D.10[B]-[J] (These states are California,
Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1997) provides that "[tihe Legislature
hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an
expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation ... and that
there is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations."
107. Id. § 987(c)(1).
108. Id. § 987(d).
109. Id. § 987(e)(1)-(2).
110. Section 987(b)(2) defines a work of fine art as "an original painting, sculpture, or
drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality, but shall not include
work prepared under contract for commercial use by its purchaser."
111. Edward J. Damich, State "Moral Rights" Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291,293 (1989).
112. Id. at 297. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2152(4) and (7) (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 855(b) (West Supp.
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B) (Michie 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (West
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protect literary or musical works. 113 Claims asserted for violations of
the right of integrity under these statutes generally require some proof
of damage to the artist's reputation be reasonably likely in order to
obtain relief for a modification or mutilation of a work.'
14
At the federal level, protection for the right of integrity exists
only in the limited statutory grant established in the U.S. Copyright
Act. 15 The Visual Artists Rights Act amended federal copyright law
to protect the "moral rights" of artists for a limited class of works de-
fined in the statute as "visual art."'116 Although copyright law in gen-
eral does not protect the physical object in which a copyrightable ex-
pression is manifested, the intent of VARA is to promote art
preservation, and thus protection is provided to the tangible obj ects in
which the works are fixed.117 Under VARA copies of artwork falling
within the definition are protected from distortion, mutilation, modifi-
cation or destruction which would be prejudicial to an artist's reputa-
tion or honor. 18 Copies falling outside the definition of "visual art"
are not protected from such acts.
11 9
1996).
113. Damich, supra note 111, at 298.
114. Id. at 304 n.66. Rhode Island does not require proof of damage to reputation.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996).
116. A "work of visual art" is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple case, carved or fabricated sculp-
tures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the
signature or other identifying mark or the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include-
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, peri-
odical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or
packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
117. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual
Artist's Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14
COLUM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 479 (1990).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (1996).
119. Ginsburg, supra note 117, at 481. The extent to which VARA preempts state law
claims for right of integrity violations.is discussed infra Section IV.A.
.1997]
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The right of integrity does not apply to "any reproduction, depic-
tion, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection
with" an "electronic information service, electronic publication, or
similar publication," as described in the definition of a "work of visual
art., 120 Thus, a digital reproduction of a work used in connection with
an electronic publication of the work is not protected under VARA.
The definition of visual art and the purpose of protecting the physical
integrity of a work, does not seem to contemplate digital reproduction
and publication. This is relevant to the issue of viability for claims
brought in the digital environment as we shall soon see.
D. Summary
Moral rights have developed over a period of several hundred
years, asserted first in the context of protecting a common law interest
preserving some economic interest in a work distinct from the statu-
tory grant of copyrights, and later asserted from the perspective of the
high cultural value accorded an artist and his work. The permutations
of national laws covering the right of integrity, range from protection
and preservation of tangible works, to protection of artists through the
grant of a personal veto over third-party modifications of his work or
by grant of legal standing where the artist's reputation or honor is al-
legedly harmed by such modifications.
The varying types of protection are going to be highlighted by the
global nature of cyberspace and the digital distribution of works of
authorship. Artists are very much aware of the risks involved in global
accessibility of digital works.121 The subject has not escaped the atten-
tion of international trade negotiators either. 122 An overview of new
technologies and the characteristics of digital works will set the stage
for analysis of the conflicts of laws issues that will doubtless arise in
claims for violations of the right of integrity.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (1996).
121. See Greguras, supra note 78. The following declaration was found on a website,,
although curiously without assertion of the right of integrity:
(2) Assertion of moral rights
Save where otherwise specified the author(s) of the literary and artistic works set
out in the Pages contained in this Website has/have asserted his/her/their moral
rights to be identified as the author of those works. Their identities are set out in
the Pages containing their works.
<http://www.aibbankci.co.uk/copyrigh.html>.
122. ITLP, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC: Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), (visited Sept. 15, 1997) <http://
ra.irv.uit.no/trade_law/documents/freetrade/gatt/art/ii.html>. Clauses excepting protection
for moral rights under GAIT and Nafta were written explicitly into these treaties. See
NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.02[D][5].
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II
Convergence in the Digital Environment
A. Telecommunications Revolution and Advances in New Digital
Technologies
In 1858 the first transatlantic cable was laid between Ireland and
Newfoundland. Upon completion, the congratulatory message from
Queen Victoria to President Buchanan, took an entire day to transmit
and receive.123 Subsequently, many inventors tried to create methods
to "hack" the existing submarine cables which were very difficult to
install and operate.124 Alexander Graham Bell invented a system by
which resonating analogue waves were sent through cable systems,
and hacked existing cables which until that time had supported teleg-
raphy which was purely digital in nature.
125
A telecommunications revolution is again underway with' new
cables, satellites and other delivery systems are rolling out of cargo
bays constantly. The ongoing FLAG project, (Fiber Optic Link
Around The Globe) which enters the ocean at Porthcurno, England,
and exits in Japan, is a 28,000 kilometer cable which will create
120,000 communication circuits. 126 In a few years, several new projects
laying optical fiber will provide broad bandwidth connections to the
Internet 127 and associated communications networks linking Asia,
Africa, Europe and the U.S.1 28 The resulting distribution channels for
digital works will change the way information is delivered around the
globe.
The backbone of the Internet is the telecommunications lines
which give people access to globally connected computer networks.
123. Neal Stephenson, The Hacker Tourist Travels the World To Bring Back The Epic
Story of Wiring the Planet, WIRED, Dec. 1996, at 117. The account of Dr. Edward White-
house and his rival William Thomson in the quest for global communication by wire is fas-
cinating if nothing else. Thomson ultimately won the day with his patented mirror galva-
nometer that could detect the faint magnetic fields pulsing through the transoceanic wire
and was elevated to the status of Lord Kelvin by Queen Victoria. Id.
124. Id. at 145. The author notes that once in place, a cable "tends to be treated not as
a technological artifact but almost as if it were some naturally occurring mineral formation
that might be exploited in any number of different ways." Id.
125. Id. at 148. Hacking may be defined as utilizing existing facilities for new uses. Mo-
dems hack current analogue technology by simply converting digital information into a
"waveform that can be transmitted down existing wires." Id.
126. Id. at 103.
127. See generally White Paper, supra note 7, at 7-9.
128. Stephenson, supra note 123, at 104.
19971
Under the 1934 Communications Act,1 2 9 purveyors of pipelines were
categorized as "common carriers" and were not permitted to create
content and insert content into their distribution networks. This has
changed with the Telecommunications Act of 1996,130 which lifts this
ban and permits telephone to compete with traditional broadcasting
concerns for creation and distribution of information content.131 The
old regulatory framework which compartmentalized telephone, cable
and broadcasting sectors, has become less useful because new tech-
nologies blur the distinctions between these sectors.
132
The telecommunications industry is undergoing a technological
and regulatory revolution worldwide. 133 Internationally, there is a
wave of liberalization efforts as the old national monopolies are chal-
lenged by new technology.134 As a result, doors are opening for many
types of information and communications service providers. 135 The
World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the International Telecom-
munications Union ("ITU") are establishing a working relationship to
assess the impact of "free trade principles for national regulatory re-
gimes and the telecommunications industry."
36
The race to acquire a share of these wired and wireless conduits is
intense, and the reward is access to invaluable vehicles which can
shuttle content around the globe. Recently, a business consortium lo-
cated in the Kingdom of Tonga filed with the International Frequency
Registration Board of the ITU for permits to lock up sixteen geosta-
tionary orbital ("GSO") positions over the Pacific Ocean. 137 The in-
129. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1934).
130. Richard E. Wiley, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 440 PLI/PAT 303 (1996).
131. Id. The common carrier status imposed on telecommunications providers under
the 1934 Act has been lifted to a large extent.
132. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2402
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring) ("regulation of new technologies may require a less cate-
gorical approach as we approach the time of a common receiver/device used by consum-
ers.").
133. Harold M. White Jr. & Rita Laurie, The Impact of New Technologies on Internet
Telecommunications Law and Policy: Cyberspace and the Restructuring of the International
Telecommunications Union, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1995).
134. Veronica M. Ahern et al., Developments in the International Marketplace, 427
PLI/PAT 273-75 (1996). See also SCHNAU INS LAND, Sept. 1996 at 4 (reporting that the
German telecommunications Leitungsmonopol (monopoly) will be abolished in 1998).
135. Kenneth R. Propp, The Eroding Structure of International Telecommunications
Regulation: The Challenge of Call-Back Services, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 493 (1996).
136. ITU/96-4: ITU Releases New Study on Regulatory Implications of Trade Agree-
ments on Telecommunications (visited on Feb. 5, 1996) <http://www.itu.ch/press/1996/ itu-
04e.html>.
137. See Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim Or-
bital Spectrum Under International Space Law, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69 (1996).
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ternational community raised strong objections to this "financial
speculation" scheme, and after a short stand-off the Tonganese com-
pany reduced its request to six GSO positions which were approved by
the ITU. 38 This relative coup of satellite positions will obtain a great
value as Asia comes "on-line."'
139
Private satellite network schemes are creating hot new areas for
development. 4 ° The "Teledesic" project is a venture between Bill
Gates and Craig McCaw with plans to launch 840 low level orbiting
satellites to provide "direct satellite links to personal comput-
ers ... freeing them from the constraints that affect telephony, cable
television and even wireless transmissions.' 141 Additionally, a wave of
newly licensed spectrum has been auctioned by the FCC for develop-
ment of new distribution technologies. Digital broadcast licenses are
issuing from the FCC, and AT&T announced in February of 1997 that
it would provide wireless access to the Internet at 128 kbps, nearly
four times the speed of currently popular modems. 42 High speed mo-
dems and wireless access will provide the bandwidth necessary to
carry entertainment products.143 Research and development activities
are focusing on the use of coaxial cable in conjunction with wireless
technology to provide "head-snapping delivery of graphics, anima-
tions, sound files, even movies."
144
Digital distribution platforms are becoming increasingly interac-
tive, with video on demand and other on-line applications delivered
through coaxial cable, fiber optic networks, and via wireless spectral
transmissions. 145 In the very near future there will be "[n]o practical
distinction [between] the television screen and the computer monitor;
138. Id. at 73.
139. Id.
140. Heather Millar, Rockets for the Rest of Us; Who says a Satellite Program Can't be a
Garage Start-up, WIRED, Sept. 1996, at 102.
141. Technology Brief, The Final Frontier, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1996, at 70.
142. Courtney Macavinta, Look Ma Bell, No Wires (visited Feb. 25, 1996) <http://
www.news.comiNews/Item/0%2C4%2C8293 %2C00.html ?nd>.
143. See Lucien Rhodes, The Race For More Bandwidth, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 140-42.
The race to provide faster access to larger digital files is spurring the introduction of new
products. Phone and cable companies are preparing to offer a new range of products to
permit high-speed access to the Internet. Time-Warner recently began to offer high speed
cable modem access to subscribers in Southern California at 10 mbps, which represents a
thousand fold increase over standard modems. See Jeff Pelline, More Fast Lanes Lead to
Net, (visited Jan. 22, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C7262%2C00.
html?nd>.
144. Rhodes, supra note 143, at 140.
145. Bradford C. Auerbach, The Infobahn: Who Pays What?, 428 PLI/PAT 7, 9 (1996).
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both present viable outlets for the user's end of the pipeline."'146 There
may be little to distinguish the "couch potato from the mouse potato"
excepting the fact that the mouse potato can cut, paste and rework
digital materials to be redistributed via the same networks.147 These
types of electronic activities represent a shift in paradigm as wire and
wireless technologies provide a new way to deliver digital entertain-
ment products to customers. 14 Software companies are producing
platforms designed to support interactive and collaborative virtual
environments.149
Push technology and the fusion of television with computers will
allow digital artists to be transformed into entertainment providers.
150
Push technology allows information and entertainment to cascade
through the entire network of "all forms of communications devices"
gently propelled by anyone who wishes to broadcast materials
throughout the globe.151 The combination of new distribution pipe-
lines and interactive software distribution platforms will allow
"everyman" to be a movie maker, music publisher, new provider or
video game distributor.
52
The race for acquisition of pipeline and for the development of
digital delivery software fuels the demand for content. The value of
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Craig Harding, On-line Distribution of Multimedia Products, 428 PLI/PAT 425,
439-40 (1996). New technology is bringing WebTV to hotel rooms across the country. The
packages include unlimited access to the Internet, chat rooms, and "Kid-Friendly" with
plans to include the capacity to play Sony video games. See Jeff Pelline, WebTV Wires Ho-
tel Suites,, (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/
0%2C4%2C7620%2C00.html?nd>. Digital streaming technology is creating smoother de-
livery of audio and audio-visual works. See generally, Jan Ozer, Web TV Tunes In, PC
MAG., Mar. 26, 1996, at 129.
149. Selected Tax policy implications of Global Electronic Commerce (visited Nov.
1996) <http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/tax/internet.html>. See also Don Clark, Interval
Research is Spinning off Three Firms to Parlay Inventions, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 14,
1996, at 11.
150. Kevin Kelly & Gary Wolf, PUSHI Kiss Your Browser Goodbye: The Radical Fu-
ture of Media Beyond The Web, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 12.
151. Id. at 14. Developing technologies such as Castanet, PointCaste and Netscape In-
Box Direct, provide software platforms which permit content to be "pushed" to the recipi-
ent in a type of individualized broadcast. "[A]nything flows from anyone to anyone - from
anywhere to anywhere - anytime ... a true network like the telephone system, rather than
a radiating system like radio or TV." Id. See also Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Eyes Ma-
rimba's Castanet, (visited Dec. 24, 1996) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/
0%2C4%2C6482%2C00.html?nd>; Jai Singh, PointCast: Pushing a Paradigm (visited Dec.
31, 1996) <http://www.news.com/News/SpecialFeatures/0,5,6598.html>.
152. Steven Levy, How the Propeller Heads Stole the Electronic Future, N.Y. TIMES
(Magazine), Sept. 24, 1995, at 58-59.
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content and the cost associated with producing it, are high 153 and the
demand will only intensify as people connect to the global network.154
These factors implicate the right of integrity because digital content
has certain characteristics which make it relatively easy to manipulate
and reincorporate portions of creative works in new works broadcast
to the world. An overview of pertinent characteristics of digitized
works is useful to illustrate this assertion.
B. Characteristics of Digital Works
In this age of interactivity, the capacity to download and redis-
tribute expressive works creates certain problems. Recently two songs
from Irish super-band U2, were made available to the public before
they were officially released. 5 5 The music bubbled silently in binary
files on a computer in the recording studio in Dublin, until a computer
hacker apparently downloaded the files containing two songs and dis-
tributed them to fans at Internet sites in four countries.
156
William Gibson experienced a similar fate when "Internauts"
cracked the encryption code on his multimedia work "Agrippa.
15 7
The work was subsequently uploaded to the Internet and made avail-
able internationally. Copyright owners "recognize the immense mar-
ket awaiting their products," but the World Wide Web creates oppor-
tunity for world wide theft equivalent to the potentially global market
to be commercially exploited.
158
The situation is generally different where an artist has authorized
the use of his works or sold the copyright interests related to a work.
Recently Steven Spielberg was startled to see segments of his movie
"The Duel" spliced into an episode of the "Incredible Hulk."1 59 Spiel-
berg's movie was a 'work for hire" so that no copyright infringement
153. See Jonathan Evan Goldberg, Now That the Future Has Arrived, Maybe the Law
Should Take a Look: Multimedia Technology and its Interaction With the Fair Use Doctrine,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 919 (1995).
154. Exploitation of new media is experimentally operational on the Internet on sev-
eral web sites featuring news and entertainment products like MSNBC. Recently, Cox
Communications launched "Access Atlanta," an interactive web site with news and enter-
tainment which extends the reach of its traditional services in the newspaper and television
sectors. See Jeff Pelline, Cox Muscles into Local Markets (visited Feb. 20, 1997)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C8125%2C00.html?nd>.
155. See Cyber-pirates May Have Looted U2's New Songs, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
STAR TRIB., available in 1996 WL 6937349.
156. Id.
157. See Georgini, supra note 5, at 244.
158. Id. at 245.
159. Patric Hedlund, Artist's Rights in the Digital Universe, DIGITAL MEDIA, May 14,
1996, available in 1996 WL 9070753.
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occurred. 6° However, in the context of the right of integrity this
situation. illustrates the fact that "new media content producers rec-
ognize that as individual works are distanced from their creators they
often slip into the status of equity assets to be exploited, mined for
stock footage or video game environments." 161 Digitization provides
the basis for manipulation.1 6
2
For purposes of this discussion, the characteristic of prime impor-
tance is manipulability.1 63 Digital works can be modified and changed
to achieve some startlingly realistic results, as was recently illustrated
in the movie "Forrest Gump" where Tom Hanks was digitally blended
into scenes with Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.1" This es-
sential characteristic of digitized material has spawned numerous
software applications designed to place powerful modifying tools in
the hands of would be artists.
1 65
Many tools which can be used to adapt or modify digital works
are relatively inexpensive and widely available in the marketplace. For
example, a recently released program from Corel places a powerful
electronic paintbrush in the hands of any would be artist. 166 The pro-
gram allows the user to morph and manipulate images on a scale of
15,000 pixels per inch, and includes 10,000 clip-art images. 67 Similar
programs permit the modification of audio and visual works of
authorship and make the use of preexisting material efficient and de-
sirable.1
68
Techniques which involve manipulating and reincorporating bits
and pieces of digital works have been characterized as "digital sam-
160. Id. Following the incident Spielberg has begun to campaign for increased "moral
rights" protection for film-makers.
161. Hedlund, supra note 159.
162. See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
(1992). Binary code, computer readable digits represented by l's and O's, is easily reorgan-
ized to modify the characteristics represented by the code.
163. See Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 323, 326 (1990) (discussing pertinent
characteristics of digital works). See also Don E. Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment
as Intellectual Property on the Information Superhighway: The Challenge of the Digital
Domain, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 61 (1994).
164. Greguras, supra note 78.
165. See, e.g., the April 1997 edition of NEW TEKNIQUES: FOR LIGHTWAVE 3D &
VIDEO TOASTER/FLYER USERS, featuring reviews and articles about RenderFX, AV8R,
Audio Thunder, AVILoad 2.0, Lightwave and other powerful software used by computer
animators at Digital Domain and other digital effects companies.
166. See Arie Moller, Corel and Xara Team Up to Create a Picture-Perfect Illustrator,
PC MAG., Mar. 12, 1996, at 48.
167. Id.
168. NEW TEKNIQUES, supra note 165.
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pling."' 169 Isolated portions of digitized works can be rearranged and
recombined with other portions to create new modified works.
170
Sampling of musical and visual works is becoming commonplace in
entertainment products and advertising.' 71 The nature of the elec-
tronic environment "encourages users to add their own contributions
to existing works and to link other works together,"'172 thus digitized
works raise significant issues in the context of the right of integrity. In-
teractivity and the availability of tools which can modify and incorpo-
rate creative touches have already begun to create problems on the In-
ternet. Recently a lawsuit settled for $20,000 over "digital plagiarism"
when a "Newsday" editor scanned and reworked a copyrighted stock
photograph for the publication's front page. 73 The digital frontier is a
rich playground for "binary buccaneers" who download and manipu-
late everything from Playboy centerfolds to wholesome images of
Winnie the Pooh.
174
Entertainment products in cyberspace will be customized to fill
the demand of Generation-X: MTV fed, short attention span, anima-
tion loving, special effects demanding, virtual reality inhabiting con-
sumers of the next decade. Interactive multimedia works fill this de-
mand as they blend admixtures of content from every medium
incorporated to create a richer more viscerally forceful experience.
75
While it is true that the cost of producing new creative content is going
to fall given the new technologies, because of the particular emotive
power or cultural force of works that have been created in the past,
these items will continue to be incorporated in new digital content
169. See Randy S. Kravis, Does a Song by Any Other Name Still Sound as Sweet?:
Digital Sampling and its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 237-38 (1993). Sam-
pling can be accomplished from digital works, or analogue sounds converted into binary
code.
170. Grogan, supra note 83, at 314-15.
171. See Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of De-
ceased Entertainer - A 21st Century Challenge For Intellectual Property Law, 41 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19, 20 (1993). For a discussion of the manipulability of digitized photo-
graphic works, see John Gastineau, Bent Fish: Issues of Ownership and Infringement in
Digitally Processed Images, 67 IND. L.J. 95, 97 (1991).
172. Georgini, supra note 5, at 273-74.
173. Barbara Hoffman, From Virtual Gallery to the Legal Web, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1996,
at 5.
174. James Coates, On Internet, Copyrights Are Easy Prey For A Thiefs Hungry
Mouse: Digital Revolution Outpaces The Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1996, at 1.
175. See generally SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 1.01[A], at 1-9 (2d ed. 1997). A
Multimedia work "(1) combines two or more of the following types of information: text,
still images, moving images, sounds, and computer programs; (2) is stored in digital form
on magnetic or optical media; (3) can be transmitted to and displayed on a video screen;
and (4) allows for user interaction." Id.
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since they create nostalgia, a time reference, or a basis for reinterpre-
tation of popular and cultural values. Although copyright law is
changing with the times to protect the economic rights of creators in
digital works, the right of integrity may not survive the digital envi-
ronment.
C. Copyright Law in Cyberspace
In the arena of international copyright, content "whizzes across
political boundaries, digitized, manipulable, ephemeral."'17 6 The avail-
ability of digital works is creating a new wave of commercial and ex-
pressive opportunity, and proposed changes to copyright law are at-
tempting to keep pace. The Clinton Administration's "White Paper"
on the application of intellectual property law in cyberspace has pro-
posed certain amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976.177 The White
Paper suggests the expansion of the definition of distribution to in-
clude "transmission" of digital works across the Internet. 178 The Re-
port concludes that minor changes to copyright law will "provide the
necessary balance of protection of rights-and limitations on those
rights-to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.' ' 179 The
White Paper takes a cautious view to the issue of the right of integrity
in cyberspace noting that "thought must be given to the scope, extent
and especially the waivability of moral rights in respect to digitally
fixed works, sound recordings and other information products."1 80
On the international front, two new treaties were concluded
through the World Intellectual Property Organization in December of
1996.181 The new Copyright Treaty addresses certain issues pertaining
to the on-line environment, and is a self-standing agreement referenc-
176. Mathew Horseman & Mike Holdness, Copyright Crashes on the Superhighway,
INDEPENDENT, July 11, 1995, at 16-17.
177. White Paper, supra note 7, at 239.
178. The proposed definition would amend § 101 to include:
(1) in the definition of "publication" by striking "or by rental, lease or lending" in the first
sentence and insert "by rental, lease, or lending, or by transmission"; and
(2) in the definition of "transmit" by inserting at the end thereof the following: "To
'transmit' a reproduction is to distribute it by any device or process whereby a copy or
phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it is set." Id. at app. 1 - Pro-
posed Legislation at 2.
179. Id. at 17. See id. at app. I for full texts of the proposed amendments.
180. Id. at 154. The White Paper calls for a reanalysis of the international norms for
moral rights given the inherent manipulability of digital works and the increasing popular-
ity of multimedia works.
181. WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted Dec. 20, 1996); WIPO Performances and Pho-
nograms Treaty (adopted Dec. 20, 1996).
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ing the Berne Convention. 182 The new agreement reaffirms the appli-
cability of Berne to the digital network, including the Article 6bis
provision on moral rights.183 The Treaty explicitly contemplates the
application of copyright law to cyberspace and provides that:
[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right
of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by
wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public
of their works in such a way that members of the public may access
these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them.
184
Thus, the right of integrity is to be protected in the digital envi-
ronment under the new treaty arrangement.
A specific provision on moral rights falls under the WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty.185 The preamble notes that pro-
tection for performers such as "actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and
other persons" 186 participating in the production of sound recordings
need to be protected in the converging age of "information and com-
munication technologies."' 187 The new Treaty references the Rome
Convention for Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations rather than the Berne Convention,
and thus a specific statement of moral rights protection was neces-
sary.188 Article 5 of the Treaty provides:
(1) Independently of a performer's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards live aural
performances or performances fixed in phonograms, have the right
to claim to be identified as the performer of his performances ... and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his
performances which would be prejudicial to his reputation.
This provision extends a right of integrity to any performer,
whether back-up singer, lead singer, or musician, and gives the right
with reference to harm to reputation in a similar fashion as Article
6bis of the Berne Convention. 18
9
It may be concluded from the relative positions asserted in the
White Paper and in the WIPO Treaty provisions that the application
of moral rights in the digital environment remains an issue of conten-
182. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 1 (1) provides that the new treaty is a "special
agreement" authorized under article 20 of the Berne Convention.
183. Id. art. 1(4).
184. Id. art. 1(8).
185. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 181, art. 5.
186. Id. art. 2.
187. Id. pmbl.
188. Id. art. 1.
189. See discussion of art. 6bis, supra note 64.
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tion. It is likely that when and if Congress implements legislation in
accession to the new treaties, it will derogate with respect to the moral
rights provision.
D. Summary
The converging nature of digital technologies and distribution
systems will make the delivery of creative works ubiquitous and
seamless.190 Digital imagery and sounds are inherently malleable and
this situation will create inevitable rights of integrity violations. Even
when someone uses a copyrighted work legally, taking the precautions
to get permission or verifying that a work is in the public domain, he
may find that somewhere in the globe, an artist holds a personal claim
to object to the particular use of a work. International treaty obliga-
tions continue to provide a place for moral rights claims in the context
of cyberspace, but the differing national approaches to the subject will
raise conflict of law issues which shall prove to be fairly knotty.
III
International Policies and Conflict of Laws
A. Framework for International Copyright Claims
Assessing potential claims for violations of a right of integrity in
the international setting requires both international and national legal
analysis. The Berne Convention provides for the general choice of law
principle that the law of the country where protection is sought gov-
erns claims sounding in copyright and moral rights.1 91 When a foreign
national brings a claim in a member nation of the Berne Union, he
must be given equivalent legal treatment as citizens of the forum host
190. See Kelly & Wolf, supra note 150, at 12.
191. Berne Convention, art. 5 provides in relevant part:
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under
this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nation-
als, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence
of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the
provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of re-
dress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by
the laws of the country where protection is claimed.
(3) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. However,
when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for which he
is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same rights
as national authors.
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country. 192 However, in cyberspace the concept that one can clearly
identify the country where infringement originated or all the places
where it may have occurred becomes "an outmoded vestige of the last
century.' 193 The Berne Convention contemplated copyright protection
in the context of tangible copies that could be geographically pin-
pointed.1
94
The Berne Convention, and other international treaties, provide
the minimum rights applicable to copyright protection but do not
prohibit substantively stronger protection to exist in individual na-
tional copyright schemes. 195 As such, different activities relating to
creative works may be subject to different standards of protection.
The right of integrity is a prime example of an area which will engen-
der choice of law problems since protection ranges from rudimentary
in the United States to perpetual and imprescriptable in France.
Thus, international assessment will ultimately focus on specific
national standards, and in cyberspace, perhaps the extreme national
standard, since the country with the broadest possible protection for
moral rights may serve as a magnet for claims. In order for a claim to
be heard the court plaintiff must assert personal jurisdiction, which is
increasingly based on electronic contacts in the digital environment. 196
After establishing where a claim may be brought, the plaintiff must
find out whether his work is specifically covered within the classifica-
tion of the types of works protected by national law.197 This factor has
a critical bearing on potential claims for the right of integrity. For ex-
ample, in the United States claims under VARA are only permitted
for works which fall within the statutory definition of "visual art. ' 198 It
is irrelevant, however, whether a work would be protected for claims
under the law of the country of origin, because a claim may be brought
for violation of a right of integrity "independent of the existence of
protection in the country of origin of the work." 199 Thus, given juris-
diction in a foreign country, relief could be sought regardless of the
192. Id. art. 5(1).
193. See Geller, supra note 5, at 596.
194. Id. In cyberspace, creation and distribution can occur simultaneously.
195. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 5[1]. Article 19 of the Berne Convention
provides that the Convention "shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of
any greater protection which may be granted by the legislation in a country of the Union."
196. See INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.19[2] (discussing the U.S. cases grap-
pling with the constitutional limitations of in personam jurisdiction in cyberspace).
197. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 3[1][a].
198. 17 U.S.C. § 101. See discussion of VARA, supra note 116.
199. Berne Convention, art. 5(2).
1997]
status of protection accorded the work under the laws of the country
where it was created.
200
Finally, assuming a proper statutory basis for a claim, it must be
determined whether a work has fallen into the public domain in the
country where protection is sought.20 1 It is interesting to note that this
factor may have little bearing on a claim for violation of a right of in-
tegrity since some nations provide moral rights protection even after a
work has fallen into the public domain.20 2 The potential exists for an
author to assert claims long after the work has lost its copyright pro-
tection, and this creates significant uncertainties for creators of digital
works which incorporate other pre-existing works.
The above international/national analysis of copyright claims
provides scant guidelines for artists entering cyberspace. The perme-
ability of the Internet makes it somewhat difficult to pinpoint when
and where a work has been digitally manifested or made accessible in
a given country.20 3 As an initial matter, the place where a digitally
modified "copy" is created and stored may point to the forum where
the right of integrity is violated.204 When a work is ultimately up-
loaded to the World Wide Web, the focus might be on the country
where the "transmission" originates, or on the country where the work
is accessible if the party intended his actions to cause the resulting
download.20 5 Due to the seamless nature of a globally interconnected
distribution network, works are transmitted swiftly across national
borders and this makes it "more difficult to pinpoint acts of infringe-
ment in one national territory or another."20 6 A transitory accessibility
200. See Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4, at 137-38.
201. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 3[1][a].
202. See discussion of permutations of protection for moral rights, supra Part I.C.
203. See generally William A. Tannenbaum, Intellectual Property Due Diligence for
OnLine Services, Internet Web Site Development and International Copyright Conflict of
Laws Analysis, 454 PLI/PAT 7 (1996).
204. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.24. At least one case in the United States
has held that temporarily loading a copyrighted work into RAM constitutes an infringing
reproduction. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
205. Within the European Community, the Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1988, permits a claimant to
seek relief on a tort claim in the country where a tort occurs, as defined by national law, or
where the harm is manifested. See generally NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 6[1][a].
See also Sheville v. Presse Alliance S.A. [1995] 2 W.L.R. 499 (Mar. 7, 1995) (claim for
defamation stemming from an article in a French newspaper could be properly brought in
the country where printed or in the country where injury to reputation was alleged); Monte
Carlo v. SNEP, Cour d'appel, Paris le ch., (Dec. 19, 1989) 144 R.I.D.A. 215 (1990)
(extraterritorial broadcasts of sound recordings could create liability under French law
where broadcasts resulted in harm inside France).
206. Paul Edward Geller, New Dynamics in International Copyright, 16 COLuM.-VLA
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may be too ephemeral to create a manifestation of a work sufficient to
support a moral rights violation. However, recall that assertion of a
moral rights claim requires no violation of an underlying economic
right.
The issues arising in the context of the right of integrity add to the
"radically new stresses on the Berne system."20 7 In this context the
laws of 170 countries have potential application in cyberspace which
"creates often conflicting demands and imposes values from multiple
and diverse cultures onto a single environment. '"2 °8 Even where a
court may establish jurisdiction, the question still remains what law
should be applied.2 °9
B. International Choice of Law Primer
International law may be divided into "public law" and "private
law. ' 210 International private law is "chiefly seen and felt in its appli-
cation to the common business of private persons, and rarely rises to
the dignity of national negotiation, or national controversies." 211
Claims for violations of moral rights are litigated under the private
law model, since these claims relate to the rights of persons in their
creations. As discussed above, they are thus decided under national
legislative provisions and case law governing the scope and substance
of moral rights.
Since widely divergent protection is available for right of integrity
claims, conflicts between national substantive laws are imminent in
cyberspace. A conflict arises when two nations, or "sovereign" juris-
dictions, have laws which provide substantively inconsistent legal
rights and remedies for a particular human endeavor. 212 If the rule in
only one jurisdiction applies, the result is "false conflict" since no
choice must be made about which law applies.213
J.L. & ARTS 461, 466 (1992) (New Dynamics). See also Georgini, supra note 5, at 273-74
("targeting violations of authors' right of integrity would require detecting the culpable
user" a difficult task in the world of electronic users of the Internet).
207. GELLER, supra note 206, at 467.
208. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 1.02[4].
209. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 6[a].
210. A. F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness, 245
ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13 (1994) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC § 9 (1st ed. 1834)).
211. Id. at 27.
212. See discussion on permutations of protection for the right of integrity supra Part
I.C.
213. P.M. North, Reform, But Not Revolution, 220 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 12, 206 (1990).
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The theories governing the choice of a specific national law to
these problems may be based on two basic approaches currently de-
bated in choice of law jurisprudence. The traditional international ap-
proach to choice of law has been based on notions of sovereignty, cer-
tainty and predictability as these concepts apply to obtaining relief
under national law.214 This approach has been characterized in the lit-
erature as a "rules based" approach to choice of law theory.215 Under
this approach rules are established which dictate when jurisdiction and
the application of national laws are to apply in a given situation where
no contractual choice of law provisions governs the parties' activi-
ties.216 Some nations have systematized choice of law rules through
the negotiation of international treaties.217 For example, the Brussels
Convention permits European Union members to hear claims which
arise in tort, either in the country where the act occurred or where the
injury is established.218
During the 1960's in America, the theories of modernist Brainard
Currie proposed a different approach to choice of law theory.219 Cur-
rie's school of thought posited that a judge must give effect to
"substantive policies underlying the particular rule of law adopted by
the forum legislation, and to apply foreign law only to those cases in
which the forum's policy does not purport to apply on its own
terms. ' 220 This theory looks not at sovereignty concerns but rather at-
tempts to answer a conflict of laws question to ensure that the force of
law in one system will not be nullified by the application of another
body of law.221 Thus, the modernist jurist might look at the underlying
policies which are intended to be furthered by the substantive laws,
and apply the laws of the jurisdiction that has the greatest interest in
the application of its laws.222 Since the values of a jurisdiction are ex-
214. See generally Lea Brilmayer, The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies
in the Formation and Application of Choice of Law Rules, 252 ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 13 (1995).
215. Id. at 29.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 19.
218. See Brussels Convention, discussed supra note 205.
219. Brilmayer, supra note 214, at 20.
220. Id. at 23.
221. Id. at 63.
222. Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215
ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 11, 48 (1989) (legislatures enact laws to bring
about and achieve social goals). The basic factors in the government interest calculus are
the analysis of (1) the factual relationship between the state and the litigation; (2) whether
the relationship implicates a government policy; and (3) whether a legitimate governmen-
tal interest exists which must be taken into account in the choice of law decision. Id. at 54.
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pressed in the legislation pertaining to local matters, application of the
popular will is of paramount importance.
Generally speaking, Currie's theories have not been formally ac-
cepted in the United States at the state level. 223 Nor have European
jurists accepted Currie's approach.224 Thus, on the whole, the govern-
ment interest analysis as defined by Currie has not exerted a large in-
fluence on the international choice of law scheme outside the realm of
scholarly debate.225 Even so, whether explicitly raised or not, policy
concerns do enter the analysis of choice of law decisions when a me-
chanical application of choice of law rules is deemed to work an un-
fairness. 226 Thus, in Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, S.A., the Euro-
pean Court of Justice found liability against a defendant who
discharged chlorides in a waterway in France that caused environ-
mental damage 500 kilometers away in the Netherlands. 227 Although
the activities were considered legal in France, relevant environmental
policy considerations merited the application of Dutch law, which
provided relief for the plaintiffs. 228
In the context of claims for right of integrity violations, a work
slipped into the digital stream, which allegedly causes harm to the in-
tegrity of a creative work in a distant jurisdiction may raise policy con-
cerns when relief impedes the flow of works throughout a digital net-
work. The Nimmer & Geller Treatise on International Copyright
explains that:
[I]n Anglo-American jurisdiction, courts may autonomously weigh
the interests at stake in the choice-of-law issues before them, favor-
ing national interests in hard cases. Comparable analyses followed in
many Continental European jurisdictions, allow courts to choose be-
tween laws in the light of overriding considerations of public policy
that are optimally international in scope. To the extent countries
223. Only California and New Jersey use a variation of Currie's analysis. Id. at 182.
224. Id. at 186.
225. However, the principle of "comity" arguably provides a similar result when na-
tions wish to extend judicial assistance to a sister country in its quest for crafting relief. See
Hill, supra note 222, at 24 (citing Joseph Story for the proposition that sovereignty and
comity provide the principles for resolving choice of laws issues).
226. See Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4 (discussing the French court's application of
local law to the Huston Asphalt Jungle case).
227. Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, S.A., [1976] E.C.R. 1735.
228. See Peter Hay, Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law:
Reflections on Current European and United States Conflicts Law, 226 ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 283 (1991). The European system provides a broader base for
relief than that in the United States under the "significant relationship" test applied in sev-
eral states. European jurisprudence under the Brussels Convention permits jurisdiction at
the place of injury or at the place of conduct and the doctrine of forum non conveniens has
been rejected by the European Court of Justice. Id. at 325-26.
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bind themselves by choice-of-law principles in a treaty or conven-
tion, they limit any such discretion of their court to weigh competing
national visions of relevant interests and policies. Thus a treaty, like
the Berne Convention, can enhance the reliability of the choice of
law internationally by avoiding the need for ad hoc balancing of in-
terests or policies. 
29
This assertion implicates the traditional rules based approach to
conflicts issues, and in the Berne context, the nation where protection
is sought would provide the substantive law for determination of right
of integrity claims.230 However, in practice, courts "weigh" policy con-
cerns in moral rights cases and may arrive at somewhat unpredictable
results.
231
Within the framework of international choice of laws jurispru-
dence it remains to be seen how the right to control modifications in a
"cyberworld of transformable and malleable images" will be en-
forced.232 However, several policy issues will likely bear on the de-
termination of whether and to what extent national laws apply in right
of integrity claims.
C. Policies Likely to Affect Future Viability of Right of Integrity Claims
The right of integrity presents difficult policy issues because in its
strongest form, it demands that copyrightable works be "preserved in
a pristine state." 233 The associated burdens levied on potential end-
users affects the potential flow of creative works throughout the
world.
The competing policies at issue in moral rights claims are protec-
tion for the personal interests of artists and promotion of the free-flow
of expressive materials and information.
1. Protection of Artists
The first important policy relates to the protection of artists, since
the distortion or modification of his work "mistreats an expression of
the artist's personality, affects [the] artistic identity, personality and
honor, and thus impairs a legally protected personality interest.
2 34
This legally recognized interest was shaped and defined by continental
case law in France and other nations over a period lasting nearly two
229. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 6[2][c].
230. Berne Convention, art. 5(2).
231. Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4, at 140-41.
232. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.22.
233. Georgini, supra note 5, at 273-74.
234. Merryman, supra note 40, at 1027.
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centuries.235 The policy is based in part on the premise that artists are
generally in an unequal bargaining situation, and in part on a philo-
sophic characterization of artistic work as inherently inseparable from
the personality of a creator.236 It may be argued that such protection
does in fact provide a further encouragement to creation of original
works, but the basis for the policy is not pecuniary incentive.
This policy is important to artists whose works are now available
in electronic environments. Significant concerns have arisen in Canada
over the "unpaid re-use of freelance material" used in electronic me-
dia like CD-Rom or in electronic databases.237 In September, a class
action suit was filed against Thomson Corporation seeking $100 mil-
lion in damages for the unauthorized electronic re-use of materials
created by writers, photographers and illustrators.238 The claim is
based in part on the fact that Thomson requires freelance contributors
to waive all moral rights "now in existence or hereafter created, in and
to... [all] contracted material., 239 The plaintiffs claim that this per-
mits Thomson to use their work in a "substantially altered form, in
conjunction with advertising... or in some other compromised fash-
ion the writer might otherwise object to. '240
The main issue of concern underlying a policy argument for
strong protection of rights in integrity is that artists who have licensed
various uses of their digital works may find a modified version of the
work objectionable, but would be without power to seek relief.241 This
situation obtains either where the artist has waived his moral rights, or
because of the difficulties associated with satisfactorily proving harm
or prejudice to reputation in countries which- require such proof.242
One strong proponent of artists' rights noted that:
A hyper-realist whose work is modified to resemble a Renoir has
suffered grievous harm to his/her professional identity, yet a court
would naturally struggle with addressing the issue as a prejudice of
reputation or an action akin to defamation.... [An artist may be]
faced with a 1000 different modifications to the integrity of a work
by 1000 different infringers.
243
235. Chinni, supra note 3, at 151.
236. Id.
237. Kim Goldberg, Spiked: The Future of Freelancing?, CANADIAN DIMENSION 10,
Nov. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9252194.
238. Id.
239. Goldberg, supra note 237.
240. Id.
241. Brian Greer, Response to "Copyright and the Information Highway," CANADA




Critical to this policy position is the notion that creativity would be
stifled since the integrity of a creator's work is of paramount impor-
tance.24
A creator of expressive material may not wish to have his work
digitally distributed if no strong assurance of protection for integrity
of the work attaches, especially where the work includes a strong so-
cial message.245 In countries providing no protection for integrity or
where such rights are normally waived, an artist may quickly lose con-
trol over the pure expression represented in his work. Protection for
authors' personal interests in creative work is so critical in some coun-
tries that moral rights are held to be more important than economic
rights relating to creative works.246 Under such regimes, protection for
the personal interests connecting artists to their works establishes a
strong policy basis for granting relief under moral rights claims.
2. Free Movement of Economic Goods
A countervailing policy which will affect the viability of claims
and choice of law in the context of the right of integrity, stems from
the growing worldwide trend to promote free movement of economic
goods. Cyberspace presents a "new world of information superhigh-
ways" which will provide the stimulus for expansive economic growth
in information industries.247 Disparate national treatment of the right
of integrity can create a negative impact on the distributability of digi-
tal works and on the incentive required to fuel the flow of new prod-
ucts and interactive environments. When liability could attach
throughout the globe for modifications of digital works, free-flow of
economic goods and services may be disrupted.248
United States entertainment industry representatives have been
historically opposed to moral rights since they are perceived as a bar-
rier to the free movement of entertainment products.2 49 Large invest-
ment in film production and distribution is encouraged by reduced
barriers to trade in entertainment "because of the certainty that the
244. Patric Hedlund, Artists' Rights in the Digital Universe, DIGITAL MEDIA 1 6, May
14,1996, available in 1996 WL 9070753.
245. Greer, supra note 241, Part I.
246. Hedlund, supra note 244. See also Benjamin R. Kuhn, A Dilemma in Cyberspace
and Beyond: Copyright Law for Intellectual Property Distributed Over The Information Su-
perhighways of Today and Tomorrow, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 171, 193 (1996).
247. White Paper, supra note 7, at 149.
248. Communication From the European Commission: Follow-up To The Green Paper
on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM(96) 568 final (20.11.96) at
28 [hereinafter Communication 568].
249. See Hedlund, supra note 244, 91 10.
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[product] will be able to move freely and flexibly throughout the mar-
ketplace, without any interruption in marketing sequence."250 In the
United Kingdom creators of materials for television and motion pic-
tures are regularly required to waive their moral rights in order to ob-
tain commercial outlets for their work.251 There has been compara-
tively greater commercial success in the creative industries in common
law countries where moral rights are "weak., 252 This assertion is ar-
guably buttressed by the fact that a great deal of creative talent flows
into London and Hollywood.253
In the European Union free movement of goods and services is at
the core of the Treaty of Rome which established the European
Community common market.254 The main purpose of the treaty is to
encourage the movement of tangible and intangible goods throughout
the market.255 There is an inherent tension between authors' rights
and the policy to encourage free flow of expressive materials, and
European courts are forced to balance these competing interests.
25 6
Author's rights generally may not be "exercised in a manner that in-
terferes" with the policies promoting the common market.257 National
substantive law granting intellectual property protections must yield
to Community law. Thus, the Court of First Instance of the European
Community has found that the Berne provisions "need not apply as
between E.C. member countries if they conflict with E.C. law on
point.,
258
250. Id. (quoting Jack Valenti).
251. Imogen O'Rorke, Arts: So Who Owns Kylie?, GUARDIAN, 7, Dec. 9, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 13391707.
252. Acheson & Maule, supra note 86, 6 (noting that the moral flexible environment
provided by contractual protection of creator's rights have contributed to success in the
U.K. and the U.S. as compared to the continental countries).
253. Id. 1 7. On the subject of Canadian policy relevant to moral rights protection for
digital entertainment products, the authors note that although the flexible contracting ap-
proach to artists' rights in the Anglo-American market may not be the key to commercial
successes, the apparent "correlation should give pause... in choosing which road Canada
should travel."
254. See generally Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Structuring Operations in Europe, in
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY LAW ch. 7 (1992).
255. Georgini, supra note 5, at 246-47.
256. Id.
257. Id. A prime example of this concept is the exhaustion principle which restricts the
owner of intellectual property rights from interfering with the flow of goods or services in
the European common market where they have been placed in the stream of commerce
with his permission. See Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147, L
C.M.L.R. 44.
258. Geller, supra note 206, at 467.
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A recent report from the European Commission proposes a new
look at the economic impact of moral rights protection. In 1992, the
Commission held a hearing in the European Community to determine
whether moral rights created any significant barriers to trade.259 At
that time, the Commission determined that "moral rights did not pose
any real problem as far as the Single Market was concerned. 2 60 How-
ever, the Commission has decided to reopen the question:
Differences in the level of moral rights protection in the Community
are gaining Single Market relevance in the Information Society.
Digitalisation and inter-activity, by its very nature, will lead to sub-
stantial increase in alterations of works and other protected matter,
which will also affect moral rights. As these works will, as a general
rule, be destined for Community wide exploitation, differences be-
tween Member States' legislation in the field of moral rights may
lead to significant barriers to their exploitation, notably in the field
of multimedia products and services.
26'
Thus, the Commission is proposing to study the issue to deter-
mine if disparities in national laws create "significant obstacles for the
exploitation of protected subject matter in the Information Society,
which might require action at Community level, most notably with re-
spect to integrity of such protected matter." 26 2 Claims for violations of
the right of integrity could create obstacles to the development of
multimedia works in which modifications of audio-visual works are
required to adapt products for the digital medium.
263
The European Union possesses significant economic bartering
leverage in global trade negotiations. The Community negotiates in
place of individual states in matters pertaining to the GATT and the
WTO. 2 4 Furthermore, the European Commission negotiates between
the Community and third parties with respect to the Berne Conven-
tion.265 The Community is a full-fledged member of the recent WIPO
treaties concerning copyright laws in the digital environment. 266 As
259. Communication 568, supra note 248, at 28.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
263. Acheson & Maule, supra note 86.
264. Geller, supra note 206, at 467.
265. Id.
266. See WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, art. 17; WIPO Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty, art. 26. Identical language in the respective articles provide that:
(1) Any Member State of WIPO may become a party to this Treaty.
(2) The Assembly may decide to admit any intergovernmental organization to be-
come party to this Treaty which declares that it is competent in respect of, and
has its own legislation binding on all its Member States on, matters covered by this
Treaty and that has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal proce-
[VOL. 20:59
RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN DIGITALLY DISTRIBUTED WORKS
such, European jurists may ultimately lean toward interpretations of
the moral rights provision of the Berne Convention in a fashion which
is "more in tune with E.C. interests."
267
3. Free-flow of Information
To the extent that information contained in a creative expression
is distinguishable from the expression itself, a separate policy consid-
eration is implicated: the free flow of information. Moral rights obsta-
cles to the modification of expressive works can affect the flow of so-
cially important information. Inalienable rights in this context conflict
with the concept of "free flow of information and images across inter-
national borders." 268 Limitation of copyright interests in favor of free
speech are reflected in part in the fair use doctrine in United States
copyright law.269 The current European focus on creating an
"information" society rings with a similar regard for the free flow of
knowledge.
270
In the international realm, two opposing schools of thought
dominate the debate over information flow. The positions may be
characterized as the "Prior Consent" school and the "Free Flow"
school of thought.271 Absolute free speech proponents oppose restric-
tions on the flow of information content and posit an absolute right to
"receive and impart information by any media and regardless of fron-
tiers." 272 On the other hand, prior restraint proponents assert the need
to protect cultural values (including in this context the value of artistic
dures, to become part to this Treaty.
(3) The European Community, having made the declaration referred to in the
preceding paragraph in the Diplomatic Conference that has adopted this Treaty,
may become party to this Treaty.
(emphasis added).
267. Geller, supra note 206, at 467.
268. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 4.22.
269. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
270. Communication 568, supra note 248. The "information society" is conceived as an
open society where information is accessible to European citizens made possible through
liberalized telecommunications, and broadcasting policies. See European Commission:
Background Report - The Commission's 1997.Work Programme(l), Jan. 30, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 8025838.
271. Albert N. Delzeit & Robin M. Wahl, Redefining Freedom of Speech Under Inter-
national Space Law: The Need For Bilateral Communications Alliances to Resolve the De-
bate Between the "Free Flow of Information" and "Prior Consent" Schools of Thought, 2
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 267 (1995).
272. Id. at 268.
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expression) and principles of sovereignty as a check on the free flow
of information and entertainment content.273
There has been significant debate in the United Nations about the
extent to which international satellite broadcasters should honor terri-
torial sovereignty and the debate will continue given the increasing
ubiquity of the Internet.274 The U.N. position has consistently asserted
the right of people in all nations to "the free exchange of informa-
tion," however, cultural values are considered to be a limitation on
this right.275 In the context of the right of integrity, a national policy
weighing strongly in favor of protecting cultural values and the es-
teemed place of artists in the social hegemony, could also be charac-
terized negatively as reducing the flow of information and socially im-
portant works.
A personal tie to a given expressive work can pose potential, but
uncertain, legal liability on users of material who incorporate preexist-
ing works into new digital applications. 276 Attempts to stop the flow of
digital works asserted under the moral rights theory might be out-
weighed by policy arguments for free flow of information. One won-
ders whether it is logically consistent that the works of artists should
be free from reinterpretive treatment, when an important basis of ar-
tistic expression is the interpretation of human experience. 7 Artists
are generally free to interpret culture and infuse works with social
commentary. However, unbounded protection for the right of integ-
rity would appear to unrealistically restrict the use of existing works,
in that it places the creative expression of chronologically precedent
artists beyond the reach of modification or adaptive reinterpretation.
273. Id. Of recent interest is a call by officials in India for a ban on foreign media
transmissions, based on the assertion that "Western satellite programming is at odds with
Indian traditions." See Julie Sullivan, Caught in the Waves, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 54.
274. Delzeit & Wahl, supra note 271, at 271-73. The issue of cultural imperialism has
created a broadcasting war between the United States and Cuba. See Omar Javier Arcia,
War Over the Airwaves: A Comparative Analysis of US. and Cuban Views on International
Law and Policy Governing International Broadcasts, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 199
(1996).
275. See Arcia, supra note 274, at 226.
276. Use in this context is the type which is permitted under copyright regimes, either
granted pursuant to a license or based on works in the public domain. See supra Part I.B
for discussion regarding the distinction between the authorized exploitation of economic
rights and the moral rights which remain with the creator of an expressive work.
277. Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 80 (1996). The author observes that: "Art is both evolu-
tionary and revolutionary. Art mutates according to the conscious, or even the uncon-
scious, sensibilities of the artist. That which has come before is fodder for artistic creation
and is linked inextricably to the present."
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The grant of potentially perpetual personal veto power over further
creative uses is arguably at odds with the internationally articulated
policy interest in the free flow of information.
278
D. Summary
New treaties negotiated under the auspices of the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization have reaffirmed the position that moral
rights continue to maintain a relevance in cyberspace. The interna-
tional conflict issues will arise in this area due to vastly divergent na-
tional levels of protection accorded the right of integrity in particular.
General principles under the Berne Convention guide courts to
choose the law of the forum where protection is sought, but where ju-
risdiction over the parties may be established in any number of fo-
rums, courts may be faced with applying foreign law where necessary
to effect the rights of authors. Public policy concerns designed to pro-
tect author's rights and the movement of intangibles through the
global economy will have a bearing on the choice of laws issues that
confront jurists in moral rights claims covering digital works. Historic
articulation of these interests can be discovered in a host of judicial
opinions which may shed light on the rights of parties in relation to the
integrity of works.
IV
Claims Addressing the Right of Integrity
An overview of former claims for violations of the right of integ-
rity reveals certain policy concerns in the vein of those discussed in the
previous section. It is important to recall that no violation of an ex-
clusive economic copyright need be established in order to assert a
claim for violation of a right of integrity. Litigation in this area has
provided a number of fascinating cases, and in some situations plain-
tiffs denied relief in one country obtained satisfaction on the same
facts in a different country where stronger protection was afforded.
279
278. Internationally articulated is not the equivalent of universally accepted. Protection
of cultural values is an accepted, albeit grudgingly, limitation on full blown free-market
permeation of expressive materials. As noted, it is difficult to distinguish information con-
tent from entertainment commodities. In some sense, policies promoting free-flow of eco-
nomic commodities and free-flow of information share a common goal. Many argue for the
preservation of cultural goals and against "cultural imperialism." Moral rights protection
could be characterized in terms of preservation of cultural values. For discussion of the de-
bate surrounding European broadcasting content and cinema tax restrictions see Fraser,
supra note 21.
279. See Asphalt Jungle, Cass. Civ. I, May 28, 1991, 149 R.I.D.A. 197 (1991); Shostak-
ovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 87
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A. Representative Claims in the United States
In the United States artists have had limited success asserting
claims for violations of integrity. In some of the cases, competing pol-
icy concerns are' weighed and discussed. When muralist Alfred D.
Crimi sued a church for whitewashing his twenty-six foot wide, thirty-
five foot high fresco, the court was unmoved.280 The commissioned
work had been contractually designated as property of the church, and
Crimi received the bargained for $6800 in compensation. 281 The court
found that all of the artist's interests in the work passed to the church
upon completion of the contract.
28 2
Crimi argued that a "limited proprietary interest in his work" was
preserved as necessary to protect his honor and reputation, and in this
case that included protection from "destruction, mutilation, oblitera-
tion or alteration" of the work.283 The court opined that the plaintiff
actually sought a change in U.S. law to provide protection for the right
of integrity in conformity with the laws of other counties and was not
"disposed to make any new law in this respect. ' 284 The court was not
willing to establish a personal connection between Crimi and the mu-
ral which would interfere with the church's property interest in the
work.28 5
A New York court reached a similar result in Shostakovich v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., when Russian composers sued on
a claim that their musical compositions were used, in an objectionable
manner, as background music in a film which portrayed the Soviet
Union in a negative light.286 All of the music used in the film was in
the public domain and enjoyed no copyright protection. 287 The plain-
tiffs-did not argue that the works had been distorted or mutilated, but
rather that their use in a picturewith an objectionable theme was of-
fensive. 2
88
The court noted the inherent "conflict between the moral right
and the well established rights of others to use such works." 289 Addi-
N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1949) (discussed in Dworkin, supra note 30, at 237).
280. See Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949).
281. Id. at 814.
282. Id. at 819.
283. Id. at 816.
284. Id. at 818.
285. Id.
286. 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
287. Id. at 577.
288. Id. at 578.
289. Id.
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tionally, there was the question of the standard for establishing a vio-
lation based on artistic objection, whether it could be predicated on
"good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts" or some
other concept, the court could not tell.29° The court was not sympa-
thetic to the artist's assertion of a right of integrity violated by the
adaptive use of the works. The policy underlying the principles of free
use and circulation of the compositions, contemplated under public
domain status of the works, was a concern which could not be over-
come by moral rights arguments.
Perhaps the case most cited for the proposition that protection is
available in the United States for the integrity of expressive works is
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.291 In that case, the
Monty Python comedy group sought to enjoin ABC from televising a
truncated version of the "Flying Circus" series.292 From ninety min-
utes of material, the broadcasters cut twenty-four minutes to accom-
modate advertising spots, resulting in a significant distortion of the
original material.29 3 The plaintiffs successfully invoked section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, arguing that the broadcasts misrepresented their
works to the public.294 The court agreed, finding that the economic in-
centives given under copyright law could not "be reconciled with the
inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation
of their work to the public on which the artists are financially depend-
ent. ' 295 The integrity of the "Flying Circus" had been impaired.
29 6
Although characterized to provide a cause of action equivalent to
the right of integrity, Gilliam has been recently rejected as a basis for
that proposition. In Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt
Disney Co., the court held that protection for the right of integrity
does not obtain under U.S. law.297 In that case, the plaintiff claimed
moral rights violations based on the distribution of certain videocas-
settes and laser discs of the animation classic "Fantasia" which con-
tained approximately twenty-two minutes of Igor Stravinsky's com-
position "The Rite of Spring., 298 A licensing agreement from 1939
290. Id. at 579.
291. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
292. Id. at 17.
293. Id. at 18.
294. Id. at 24-5.
295. Id. at 24.
296. Id. at 25.
297. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1996).
298. Id. at 121.
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granted the Disney company the "irrevocable right to record [the
composition] in any manner medium or form."299 The plaintiff argued
that the Lanham Act creates a cause of action for modification, dis-
tortion or mutilation of a work which violates its integrity and that
Disney's use of the composition, adapted to the new medium and dis-
cussed in the accompanying materials, was such a violation.
300
The court rejected this assertion, explaining that the "Lanham
Act proscribes a person from falsely representing that a modification
of an original work is either (1) the original work or (2) a work of the
author of the original.""3 1 As such, the court held that neither the
Lanham Act nor Gilliam "precludes persons from modifying or muti-
lating a work" and the plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law.
302
In contrast, an artist successfully asserted the right of integrity
under a state artists' rights protection statute in Wojnarowicz v.
American Family Association.30 3 In that case, an artist used sexually
explicit images in artwork designed to draw attention to the AIDS
epidemic. 3° The defendants, American Family Association ("AFA"),
took photographs of the artwork depicted in a promotional catalogue
for the exhibition, and produced fourteen fragments of the artist's
work which it compiled into a pamphlet.30 5 The pamphlet was used to
draw attention to the fact that the NEA had funded the plaintiff's art-
work.
306
The defendant argued that the pamphlet did not violate the state
statute because it did not constitute an alteration of the plaintiff's
"original work. 30 7 However, the court rejected this argument and de-
termined that distorted reproductions of the artwork could serve as a
basis for relief.3 8 The court noted that:
The statute prevents the new owner from displaying or publishing
and attributing to the creator an altered version of that creator's
work. However, nothing in the legislative history suggests that the
New York legislature intended to limit the Act's protection to that
scenario. To the contrary, because the intent of the bill was to pro-
tect not only the integrity of the artwork, but the reputation of the
299. Id.
300. Id. at 126.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
304. Id. at 133.
305. Id. at 133-34.
306. Id. at 134.
307. Id. at 136.
308. Id.
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artist, the spirit of the statute is best served by prohibiting the attri-
bution to an artist of a published or publicly displayed altered repro-
duction of his original artwork.... [I]n fact, the mass mailing of an
altered photographic reproduction is likely to reach a far greater
audience and cause far greater harm to the artist than the display of
an altered original, which may reach only a limited audience.
3°9
This opinion extends the policy of protection for the artist's work
to reproductions presented in a different medium. Here, the free use
of the "information" captured in the original photographs was limited
to the artist's right to prohibit the misattribution of a distorted version
of the works. As a practical matter, however, a distortion or mutila-
tion of a work will necessarily implicate the artist's right of attribution
when the work is publicly manifested as that of the artist.
The leading case to address the right of integrity under the fed-
eral scheme contemplated in VARA is Carter v. Helmsley Spear,
Inc.310 In that case, a trio of professional artists contracted with the
owner of a building to create sculptural works in the lobby; however,
when the building changed ownership, the new managing company
considered removing certain portions of the work, and the artists
brought suit to enjoin any alteration of their work under VARA.
311
The district court concluded that the artwork was contemplated under
the statutory definition since it qualified as a sculptural work.312 Since
the work was of the kind protectable under VARA, the trial court is-
sued an injunction.
313
Of particular interest was the issue of whether the artist's reputa-
tion or honor would have been damaged by the defendant's actions
with respect to the artwork. The court found that the terms
"prejudicial," "honor," and "reputation" were readily understood and
application of the standard meaning equated with the possibility of
injury to the plaintiffs' "good name, public esteem, or reputation in
the artistic community. 3 14 The court did not require proof that the
artist had "pre-existing standing in the artistic community" since
moral rights protection extend to the artist's personal interests in the
309. Id. at 137-38.
310. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
311. Id. at 313.
312. Id. at 315. This examination of whether the work fits within the statutory defini-
tion may be significant in the context of the preemptive effect of VARA discussed below.
313. Id. at 329.
314. Marko Iglendza, Moral Rights Protection Under the Visual Artist's Rights Act of
1990: The Judicial Interpretation in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. 187, 205 (1995) (citing Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 323).
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work for which protection is sought.315 Since expert testimony estab-
lished that these artists' reputation would be prejudiced in the rele-
vant community, the court had no trouble concluding that the artists'
reputations could be properly protected under VARA. 316 On appeal,
the Second Circuit found that the work was a work for hire and thus
excluded from protection under VARA, but affirmed the trial court's
finding that the artists' reputation would be prejudiced by the defen-
dant's actions.317 The court did not take issue with the district court
determination that harm to reputation could be established under the
district court's analysis.
Thus, to the extent available in the United States, the right of in-
tegrity is limited to certain types of works and must be asserted in
connection with harm to reputation and honor. Broad protection for
integrity claims does not exist under the U.S. system. In America,
strong economic-based policy concerns and constitutionally based free
speech concerns militate against moral rights protection. However,
plaintiffs have better success in these types of claims internationally.
B. Representative Right of Integrity Claims Abroad
In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., the plain-
tiffs were unable to convince the court that the use of their musical
compositions, adapted to the movie about the Soviet Union, created
harm cognizable under moral rights.318 However, they were successful
in obtaining an injunction in France.319 Claims for violations of the
right of integrity brought in jurisdictions outside the United States
have been more successful and evidence a strong standard of protec-
tion for artists' personal interests in their works. In some cases, moral
rights may be given effect over economic rights or over contractual
provisions to the contrary, which makes certain foreign jurisdictions
attractive to a potential claimant.32
°
The most exemplary Canadian case on point featured an artist
who sued a shopping center for hanging red ribbons on a sculptural
315. Iglendza, supra note 314, at 206.
316. Id.
317. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
318. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1949). See also
discussion, supra Section IV.A.
319. See Dworkin, supra note 30, at 237.
320. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 6[2]. One case brought in France, held that
a waiver of moral rights, contained in an otherwise valid U.S. contract, did not foreclose
the assertion of moral rights since a waiver is ineffective in France. Bragance c. Michel de
Grece, Paris, le ch., Feb. 1, 1989,142 R.I.D.A. 301 (1989).
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work called the "Flight Stop. 3 21 The sculpture, representing 60 geese,
had been commissioned by the shopping mall; however the court en-
joined the property manager from hanging Christmas decorations on
the sculpture. The artist claimed that his reputation was harmed by
the decorative modification made to his sculpture, and successfully as-
serted the right of integrity as a basis for relief.
3 22
Protection of the personal rights of artists also served as a basis
for relief in a German Court of Appeals decision, where a film com-
poser was able to obtain an injunction halting the broadcast of a
"distorted version of a film."3 23 The composer of certain musical
pieces, which were used in the German version of an Italian film enti-
tled "Christoforo Columbo," had not consented to the modification of
the musical score which sampled his compositions. 32
4
In a well know case, the heirs of director and film maker John
Huston won an injunction in France halting the broadcast of a color-
ized version of his black and white classic "Asphalt Jungle. 3 25 The
case made its way up and down the French judicial ladder twice before
the Court of Cassation, the highest appeal court for such cases, held
for Huston.
326
As director of the film, having provided his services under a work
for hire arrangement, Huston was not the author of the work under
U.S. law.327 The intermediate court thus held that the contracts estab-
lishing the relationship between Huston and the studio were governed
by U.S. law and precluded his heirs from asserting moral rights claims
in France.32 However, the high court reversed applying the strong
artists' protection policies of France to the case, and held that under
French laws, Huston was an "author" who could obtain protection for
the integrity of his film.329 The court held that such artists' protection
interests were "laws of imperative application" regardless of the na-
321. Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd., 70 C.P.R.2d 105 (Ont. High Ct. of Justice, 1982).
322. Id.
323. Zeitschrift fur Urheber - und Medienrecht (Z.U.M.) June 1992, at 307 (F.R.G.)
(summarized in Dietz, supra note 212, at n.55).
324. Id.
325. See Paul Edward Geller, French High Court Remands Huston Colorization Case,
39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 252 (1992) (analyzing the case: Arret 861 P, Cass. Civ., le
ch., hearing May 28, 1991).
326. Id. at 252.
327. Id. at 253.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 255. Geller notes that the court did not apply Berne choice of law principles
or traditional international private law conflicts principles. Rather, the court simply as-
serted French law as directly applicable to Huston's case. Id.
19971
tional origin of the works or the claimants. 330 The Court issued an in-
junction to protect Huston's choice to film the movie in black and
white, determining that colorization violated the integrity of the work.
Another case involving a distorting transformation of an original
work involved a refrigerator belonging to French artist Bernard Buf-
fet.331 In that case, Buffet had painted all 6 sides of his icebox which
was then auctioned for charity.332 Subsequently, the purchaser at-
tempted to re-auction one panel of the work which he entitled "Still
Life With Fruits" but Buffet objected to this mutilation of his work.
333
The court enjoined the sale at the second auction since the integrity of
the work had been violated by the disassembly of the icebox.
Modifications to reproductions of creative works have also pro-
vided a basis for right of integrity claims. In one illustrative case, the
court enjoined a party from reproducing a painting by J. F. Millet.
334
The reproduction version would have "added a bonnet on one per-
son's head and a scarf around a woman's neck and changed an evening
scene to one suffused by a glaring noonday sun." 335 The court opined
that the artist's genius and high calling should not be damaged by
"acts of individuals with dubious intentions guided by some transient
fashion or profit motives." 336 Thus, alterations to the original work
could be enjoined as objectionable to the author.
A more recent application of moral rights protection in this same
context occurred in 1971 when a Paris department store was sued by
the granddaughter of Rousseau-for using an altered reproduction of
his paintings as window decorations. 337 There the court found that the
altered shapes and colors in the poster reproductions violated the
right of integrity in the original works. 338 Injunctive relief was thus ap-
propriately granted for the sake of Rousseau's memory.
Taken together, these cases reveal the strong artist protection
policy which underpins much moral rights jurisprudence in Europe.
330. Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4, at 140-41.
331. Buffet v. Fersing, [1962] Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 570 (Cour d'appel, Paris)
(discussed in Merryman, supra note 40).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Millet, Judgment of May 20, 1911, [1911] Amm. I. 271 (Tribunal de la Seine)
(discussed in Merryman, supra note 40, at 1029).
335. Merryman, supra note 40, at 1029.
336. Id. (quoting Millet, Judgment of May 20, 1991, [1991] Amm. I. 271 (Tribunal de la
Seine)).
337. Bernard-Rousseau v. Societe des Galeries Lafayette, Judgment of Mar. 14,
(1973)(discussed in Merryman, supra note 40, at 1030).
338. Id.
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Courts are willing to enjoin activities which affect artists who have
long been dead or who were unable to obtain relief in a different ju-
risdiction. The Berne Convention permits competent courts to hear
such claims, so long as there is a point of attachment to the jurisdic-
tion 339 Thus, a national court with jurisdiction over the parties can
enjoin a wide range of activities protected under the right of integrity.
By comparison, economic policy concerns raised in some Euro-
pean cases illustrate the competing view that intellectual property
rights cannot be used to interfere with free movement of goods. In this
context, the European Court of Justice addressed the issue of moral
rights. In Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, the French gov-
ernment argued that moral rights could be asserted in order to restrict
the movement of sound recordings throughout the European Com-
munity.340 On this question, the court ruled that moral rights could not
be "infringed by the mere importation from one Member State into
another of recordings of a work the manufacture of which in the for-
mer member state was licensed by the composer."3 41 The fact that the
works had been fixed in sound recordings pursuant to a license quali-
fied them as free to circulate throughout the common market. Reject-
ing the French government's argument that economic policy must
yield to moral rights concerns, the court noted that moral rights could
not be used to restrict trade between member states.
342
This case illustrates the fact that the European market has cre-
ated policy interests relative to free trade which may limit the strong
artists' rights positions of certain nations. Given the primacy of the
Community in international trade negotiations, this policy may gain
importance in moral rights jurisprudence at the Community level.
3 43
National laws must yield to conflicting Community law on point.
344
339. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 4[2].
340. Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147, 159, 2 C.H.L.R. 44
(1981).
341. Id. at 174.
342. Id.
343. See Communication 568, supra note 248, at 28. Different levels of protection
throughout the European Community is "gaining Single Market relevance in the Informa-
tion Society." Id.
344. Geller, supra note 206, at 467.
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V
The Right of Integrity in Cyberspace
A. Viability of Future Right of Integrity Claims Brought in the United
States
The viability of claims for right of integrity violations is contin-
gent on the existing statutory protection for moral rights in the United
States and on policy considerations which will shape the jurisprudence
in this realm. With due regard for the general historic aversion to pro-
tection for the integrity of creative works, it is important to note that
recent U.S. Supreme Court proclamations make it clear that
"transformative" uses of copyrighted works may be consistent with
the goals of federal copyright policy.345 Transformative use presumes
a degree of accessibility and the subsequent modification and redistri-
bution of creative materials. In fact, free movement of creative mate-
rials is the foundational purpose of copyright incentive in Anglo-
American law, and barriers to the dissemination of expression are dis-
favored.346 Exclusive economic rights are granted only to the extent
that they do notrestrict public access. Unpredictable obstacles to the
incorporation of expressive materials are at odds with the fundamen-
tal purposes of U.S. copyright policy.347 Thus, significant obstacles ex-
ist at the federal level and foreign claimants will be hard pressed to
successfully assert the right of integrity.
Although, some want the United States to raise its standard to
create stronger protections in conformity with European nations, such
protection could not coexist with copyright policy determinants. 348 In
spite of earlier optimistic readings, the decision in Gilliam has not
been construed to provide general protection for integrity of works of
authorship. 349 As for existing statutory protections, VARA excludes
345. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994) (finding under
fair use analysis that transformative use of an underlying work promotes copyright goals).
346. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(explaining that the purpose of the copyright incentive is based on the ultimate goal of dis-
seminating information).
347. See generally Eric R. Bensen, The Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral
Rights Cannot Be Protected Under the United States Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1127 (1996).
348. See Intellectual Property: EU and US at Odds Over Author's Moral Rights, Eur.
Rep., Sept. 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11073012. Although the European Commission
has not officially adopted a position, observers are aware that the United States falls short
of the obligations mandated under Berne and wish to see the United States standards reach
conformity. Id.
349. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119
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electronic publications and other reproductions of works of visual
art.350 Thus, at the federal level, moral rights claimants have little op-
portunity to obtain relief for violations in cyberspace.
However, it is worth noting that some state artist protection stat-
utes may provide a slender back-door for state claims predicated on
violations of the right of integrity. Claims asserted in at least five state
jurisdictions could provide relief since they purport to apply to repro-
ductions of works.3 51 The court in Wojnarowicz applied the state
statutory protection to reproductions of the photographs.35 2 Thus,
foreign claimants may succeed with a state law cause of action for ob-
jectionable modifications or manipulation of their works made acces-
sible in cyberspace. The decision in Wojnarowicz represents the rec-
ognition that protection of reproductions of a work presented in a
different medium or context could be established under the right of
integrity. Five states create protection for reproductions in any me-
dium which are made accessible to the public and which will reasona-
bly cause damage to the reputation of an artist.
353
The efficacy of a potential claim in the digital context turns on the
preemptive effect of VARA. Several commentators claim that VARA
protects originals and not reproductions.354 It may be argued that
permitting broader state remedies for works that do not qualify under
the federal definition of "visual art" would violate the policy underly-
ing federal preemption of state copyright laws.355 However, legislative
history indicates that the federal definition leaves something to state
protection for moral rights. In one House Report, it was asserted that
VARA would not preempt state law protecting works not covered by
the definition, such as a photograph created for "non-exhibition pur-
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1996).
350. See discussion of VARA, supra Part I.C. VARA also limits protection to the term
of life of the author, thus making it impossible for claims to accrue indefinitely to heirs or
other interested parties. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
351. These states are Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. It is
interesting to note that Rhode Island does not require proof of damage to reputation to sue
for violations of the right of integrity. See discussion of state statutory schemes, supra at
Part I.C.
352. See discussion supra Part IV.A. The New York Statute specifically extends to re-
productions of works in any medium. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 14.03.
353. See supra note 351. See also specific provisions discussed supra Part I.C.
354. See Ginsburg, supra note 117, at 483 n.25 (noting that VARA does not preempt
state claims for mutilated reproductions); NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.06[F][2]
at n.213 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990): the legislative his-
tory: "questionably contends [that VARA] will not preempt a cause of action for misattri-
bution of a reproduction of a work of visual art.").
355. NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.06[F][2].
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poses." '356 One commentator found the logic of Wojnarowicz compel-
ling, since it would be unfortunate if a plaintiff on similar facts had to
file solely under VARA in which case he would be "denied any relief.
by virtue of his original artifact remaining undisturbed.
'" 357
The key to success in a state law claim would be personal juris-
diction over the defendant, but electronic contacts have been used
successfully as a basis for jurisdiction, and thus a claim could sur-
vive.35 Perhaps the best state forum would be Rhode Island, where no
proof of damage to reputation is required in order to assert a claim for
violation of the right of integrity.359 In all, claims brought in the
United States predicated on violations in cyberspace under federal
and state statutory schemes provide a slender chance of success for
foreign claimants.
In comparison, claims brought in the U.S. based on extraterrito-
rial acts of moral right's infringement face additional obstacles. One
significant difficulty is presented by the fact that U.S. courts generally
shy from the application of foreign laws to copyright claims.360 U.S.
courts generally look for a reason to have copyright claims based on
foreign substantive law dismissed and tried abroad. Even leading
commentators on the subject acknowledge that "read narrowly, nei-
ther domestic laws nor the conventions directly provide legal grounds
for a forum outside the protecting country to apply that country's laws
to an infringement case." 361 In addition, the Ninth Circuit recently
held that mere authorization of extraterritorial infringement of copy-
right interests does not provide standing to sue for relief under U.S.
copyright law.
362
356. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990).
357. NIMMER Treatise, supra note 38, § 8D.06[F][3][a].
358. INFORMATION LAW, supra note 22, § 1.06.
359. See discussion supra Part I.C.
360. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1275,
1287 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (alleged extraterritorial infringements not addressed by the court
noting that the plaintiff would have to pursue relief abroad); Skelton Fibres Ltd. v. Canas,
1997 WL 97835 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997) (dismissing claims for copyright infringement al-
legedly occurring in Spain on grounds of forum non conveniens). One notable exception
was London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the court refused to dismiss the parties merely because the appli-
cation of foreign copyright laws would be applied if the case went to trial.
361. NIMMER & GELLER, supra note 32, § 3[4][a]. See also Propp, supra note 135
(discussing the uneasiness with which the FCC approached the enforcement of foreign
telecommunications regulations to international telephone service disputes).
362. Subafilms. Ltd. v. MGM Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1994).
See also Kelch, supra note 12.
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American courts generally dismiss claims brought under foreign
copyright laws where possible. This is an important realization given
the fact that electronic contacts may subject U.S. defendants to in per-
sonam jurisdiction making it attractive to attempt suit in this country.
Many Website designers and interactive entertainment producers are
located in the U.S., however, the obstacles summarized above will
make it difficult to bring a claim for the right of integrity in digitized
works in the United States
B. Viability of Future Right of Integrity Claims Under Other National
Schemes
Under many national schemes moral rights are alive, well, and
purportedly expanding into the digital stream. 363 Digitally distributed
works which are accessible in these territories may provide the requi-
site basis for in personam jurisdiction. If electronic accessibility or
"communication" of a work over the Internet provides a basis for ju-
risdiction, even a transitory manifestation of a modified reproduction
could give rise to liability. Thus, in Societe Nationale de Programmes
Antenne 2 v. Spadem, the murals of French artist Edoard Vuillard, af-
fixed to the walls of the smoking bar of the Theatre Champs-Elysees,
appeared in a television broadcast featuring visuals of the Theater.
364
The artist sued for royalties in connection with the broadcast, and the
defendant claimed that the fleeting nature of the visual reproduction
of the murals should qualify for the "brief quotation" defense.365 The
court held that the complete reproduction of the work, regardless of
the duration or medium in which it could be perceived, did not qualify
for the "brief quotation" defense.366 The application of this type of
rationale to right of integrity claims in cyberspace would greatly in-
crease the chances of success for foreign claimants.
Given the requisite basis for jurisdiction, Huston's Asphalt Jungle
could have potentially far reaching ramifications for digitally manipu-
lated creative works.367 Where a national court applies local strong
artists' protection policies in a determination of rights, activity which
is permitted in one jurisdiction may create liability in another. In As-
363. See discussion supra Part I.C.
364. Societe Nationale de Programmes Antenne 2 v. Spadem, French Cour De Cassa-
tion (Supreme Court) [1996] ECC 81, July 4, 1995.
365. See Berne Convention, art. 10(2), which provides that a limitation similar to the
fair use defense in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act may be incorporated into national
laws.
366. Societe Nationale, [1996] ECC 81.
367. Geller, supra note 325, at 257.
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phalt Jungle, the court did not weigh the competing policies underly-
ing traditional conflict of laws analysis. 368 Rather, since the plaintiffs
sought protection in French territory, national law applied directly re-
gardless of the contractual arrangement governing the parties' rela-
tionship in the U.S. 369 Under the varying degrees of national right of
integrity protections, all the members of a creative team that contrib-
ute to the expression in work may have a moral rights claim preserved
and potentially asserted.370
Cases like Millet and Bernard-Rousseau, discussed above, 37 1 illus-
trate the fact that reproductions of original works which are modified
may very likely subject digital artists to liability in foreign jurisdic-
tions. Artists' protection policies outweigh legitimate economic inter-
ests in France. However, it is possible that such claims could be chal-
lenged as an inhibition to free-flow of economic goods and
information and effectively denied by the European Court of Justice
as conflicting with the European Community Treaty.3 72 International
trade policies in the context of the European Information Society will
figure prominently into the moral rights debate as new technology is
installed globally. The Commission's decision to reopen the study of
whether the right of integrity poses a barrier to the Community Single
Market illustrates the growing importance of this policy concern. The
reality is that economic and information free-flow policy concerns
may soon outweigh the personal rights sought to be protected by the
right of integrity.
C. Issues Which Must be Resolved to Establish a Workable International
Regime
There can be little doubt that the digital distribution of informa-
tion and interactive entertainment products will become a major part
of the electronic economy, and as such assessing the applicability of
moral rights presents an important issue.373 Current attempts to ex-
tend copyright law into the digital environment have focused on
whether activities on the Internet should be characterized as distribut-
368. Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 4, at 139.
369. This is in concert with the Berne provision which makes the law of the country
where protection is sought provide the standard.
370. Geller, supra note 325, at 257. In the Huston case, protection extended to the di-
rector of the film and to a writer who contributed to the screenplay. Id.
371. See supra notes 334, 337 and accompanying text.
372. Geller, supra note 206, at 467.
373. White Paper, supra note 7, at 148.
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ing copies or as creating public communications. 374 Providing interna-
tional standards for the right of integrity would prove to be much
more difficult; The standard for the broadest based protection is sub-
jective, allowing an artist to object to the use of a work or to its modi-
fication according to personal discretion. In countries requiring proof
of likely harm to reputation or honor, the legal standard is also diffi-
cult to pinpoint. It would seem to require the digital manipulator to
predict whether a given artist would find the modifications harmful to
his or her honor or reputation.
Furthermore, it may be hard to predict exactly when liability for
such modifications ceases to be an issue. Some nations provide limited
terms of protection while others extend moral rights into near perpe-
tuity. Thus, the possibility of a claim asserted long after the death of
an artist further clouds the capacity to predict liability for modifica-
tions of digital works.
One suggestion relating to harmonization proposed that the right
of integrity should be specifically waivable. 315 If implemented, this
solution may provide some certainty when the original author can be
identified. However, in nations which permit virtually perpetual as-
sertion of claims, preserved to family descendants or to a governmen-
tal entity, waiver does not solve the problem. To the extent that dis-
cernible rights are assigned to representatives of an artist's estate, a
waiver could be requested. However, where no recognizable entity
exists to manage discernible rights, these issues would be difficult to
resolve under a waiver system.
As a practical matter the waiver concept serves as a recognition
that the right of integrity is difficult to preserve in the digital environ-
ment, since creators would be required to waive moral rights as a mat-
ter of standard practice.
376
Further harmonization of the various types of protection is prac-
tically unworkable. Protection will not survive consistent with the
broadest possible legal regime, because it will probably be adjudged to
be at odds with important economic and information dissemination
policies.377 Investment activities needed to build the global communi-
374. See discussion supra Part II.C, concerning the new WIPO Treaties and the White
Paper.
375. See, e.g., Exposure '94: A Proposal for the New Rule of Intellectual Property for
Multimedia, Institute of Intellectual Property 18 (Feb. 1994) (cited in White Paper, supra
note 7, at 147).
376. See supra Part III.B for discussion of the class action suit filed against Thomson
contesting the effect of mandatory waiver provisions.
377. See discussion of policy issues, supra Part III.B.
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cations infrastructure are predicated in part on the assumption that a
free-flow of economic products and information policies will jump-
start the creation of content. 7 s Content creators will be looking for
predictable parameters guiding the permissible uses of materials
which are licensable or in the public domain. The strongest right of in-
tegrity regimes create a significant disincentive for digital content
providers.
An alternative basis for harmonization would be based on a lower
common denominator of protection. Under that approach, an artist
would have to prove that his reputation or honor has been damaged
by a particular modification to his work, and there must be a limited
term for the protection.379 This too seems unlikely, since proof of
damage to an artist's reputation in a given community would prove to
be a difficult standard to articulate in a global digital environment.
Apparently, Christmas ribbons draped over sculptural works in Can-
ada may be considered harmful to an artist's reputation.380 Thus a
reputation-based approach to the right of integrity may also be practi-
cally unworkable, since an internationally consistent standard for de-
fining damage to reputation and honor would seem impossible to im-
plement.
The solution is probably an unhappy one for artists' protection
policy proponents. The right of integrity may not survive the rush to
the digital marketplace, as a separate personal right, independent of
contractual arrangement or the exclusive rights generally accorded
under copyright regimes. 381
VI
Conclusion
Moral rights shall continue to occupy a prominent position
throughout international copyright debates. Permitting a gossamer
thread to attach between an artist and the integrity of his work may be
an unreasonable international burden on the flow of expressive con-
tent. The World Wide Web provides new global access for the com-
378. See Rice, supra note 15, noting that at the last Group of Seven ministerial meeting
the European Commission concluded that "high levels of legal and technical protection of
creative content will be essential to ensure the necessary climate for the investment needed
for the development of the information society." (quotations omitted). See also Valenti,
supra note 10.
379. This is consistent with the language of the Berne Convention, art. 6bis.
380. See discussion of "Flight Stop," supra note 321.
381. Other types of moral rights may also be practically unworkable in cyberspace.
However, it may require a much longer paper to address them individually.
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mercial exploitation of expressive works. However, the countervailing
benefit to the public may require that artists relinquish the notion of
highly personal connection preserved in their works. Cyberspace is an
environment for global interactivity and collaborative experience
building. In this context, claims predicated on a right of integrity may
become practically unworkable and substantively defeated by globally
important public policy determinants.
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